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ABSTRACT: The landmark 1974 Supreme Court case of Cleveland Board of
Education v. LaFleur, which held pregnancy dismissal policies
unconstitutional, deserves a far more prominent place in our constitutional
history and canon than the case now holds. This article uses novel historical
research to recover the activism that gave rise to LaFleur and the multiple,
significant meanings of the decision for workers, school boards, feminist
lawyers, and the legal academy. In the early 1970s, women's rights organizing
within unions, grassroots feminist activism, and sex discrimination law all
evolved in symbiotic relationship. Labor and legal feminists argued for sex
equality and reproductive liberty as interdependent, necessary conditions for
women to realize the status of rights-holding persons under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Although decided upon the basis of an incoherent and quickly
discredited theory of procedural due process, the LaFleur decision also
grappled with the relationship between women's rights to equal employment
and their right to bear children. Today, rigid doctrinal categories sever the
constitutional right to sex equality from the right to reproductive liberty.
Recovering the LaFleur doctrine entails recovering an activist vision of equal
employment and reproductive freedom as inextricably related as well as a
moment at which the Court contemplated the significance of that relationship to
women's citizenship.
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INTRODUCTION
The landmark 1974 Supreme Court case of Cleveland Board of Education
v. LaFleur merits a project of historical recovery.2 No scholar has yet
2. Commentators note the importance of the case to our understanding of women's rights, the
sexual revolution, the rise of individual rights-based litigation, and constitutional law. See, e.g.,
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 306, 517-19 (2002)
(observing that the LaFleur case exemplified "trends in late twentieth-century legal culture" including
the rise of the rights-conscious individual litigant, the sexual revolution, and the necessity for
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comprehensively researched the social and legal history of the case.3 This
article argues that recovering the history of the LaFleur case can help to
illuminate the intertwined social and legal histories of the modern women's
movement and U.S. constitutional law.
Constitutional scholars have long debated the relationship between
women's equality rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause and women's privacy-related liberties protected by the Due
Process Clause.4 Today, women's rights to sex equality and to reproductive
institutional and financial support for rights-based litigation); see also Tracy A. Thomas, The Struggle
for Gender Equality in the Northern District of Ohio, in THE HISTORY OF THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
OHIO (Roberta Alexander & Paul Finkelman eds., forthcoming 2011) (discussing the LaFleur and
abortion cases).
3. For the scarce existing literature devoting brief attention to LaFleur, see LESLIE FRIEDMAN
GOLDSTEIN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF WOMEN: CASES IN LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE 456-63
(2d ed. 1988) (including excerpted text of the LaFleur decision with a few case questions); GERALD
GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 970 n.3 (10th ed. 1980) (citing LaFleur
in a footnote to a short note on the "irrebuttable presumptions" analysis); SUSAN M. HARTMANN, THE
OTHER FEMINISTS: ACTIVISTS IN THE LIBERAL ESTABLISHMENT 162-63 (1998) (discussing the financing
of the Women's Law Fund, which litigated LaFleur); PETER H. IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR
CONVICTIONS: SIXTEEN AMERICANS WHO FOUGHT THEIR WAY TO THE SUPREME COURT 307-16 (1988)
(providing a narrative overview of the LaFleur case); SUPREME COURT DECISIONS AND WOMEN'S
RIGHTS 165-67 (Clare Cushman ed., 2001) (discussing the facts and holding in LaFleur); Greg Russell,
Jo Carol LaFleur: Equal Rights for Women in the Workplace, in 100 AMERICANS MAKING
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY: A BIOGRAPHICAL HISTORY 113-15 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 2004) (giving a
biography of Jo Carol LaFleur); Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal
Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOc. CHANGE 325, 341-44 (1984) (arguing
that the majority opinion in LaFleur took a special-treatment approach to pregnancy under the Due
Process Clause rather than an equal-treatment approach under the Equal Protection Clause).
4. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 186-94
(1989) (critiquing the privacy foundation for the right to abortion); Anita L. Allen, The Proposed Equal
Protection Fix for Abortion Law: Reflections on Citizenship, Gender and the Constitution, 18 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 419, 435-39 (1995) (arguing for equal protection as an additional rather than a
substitute jurisprudential basis for the right to abortion); Ruth Colker, An Equal Protection Analysis of
United States Reproductive Health Policy: Gender, Race, Age and Class, 1991 DUKE L.J. 324, 355-57
(arguing that the Supreme Court had diluted the strength of constitutional privacy doctrine and
encouraging the development of equal protection doctrine); Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection, Due
Process, and the Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 473, 474 (2003) (arguing
that "looking at an issue stereoscopically-through the lenses of both the due process clause and the
equal protection clause-can have synergistic effects"); Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77
MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1618-45 (1979) (arguing that the strongest argument for the right to abortion lies in
an equal protection analysis of the "law of samaritanism" rather than in reproductive privacy); Elizabeth
M. Schneider, The Synergy of Equality and Privacy in Women's Rights, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 137,
152-54 (2002) (arguing that women require social and material conditions of equality to enjoy privacy
and that an equality analysis offers insight into the salutary and harmful dimensions of privacy); Reva B.
Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE
L.J. 1694, 1745-52 (2008) (arguing that the undue burden framework for evaluating abortion regulations
seeks to vindicate both the equality and liberty dimensions of human dignity). Scholars have also
identified the relationship between equality and privacy as a critical issue in the struggle for gay rights.
See Richard A. Epstein, Liberty, Equality, and Privacy: Choosing a Legal Foundation for Gay Rights,
2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 73, 95-96 (2002) (arguing that the most effective strategy to achieve gay rights
would be "to wage a two-front war" using both equality and privacy arguments); Pamela S. Karlan,
Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Justice Blackmun, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
59, 61-70 (1999) (arguing that liberty and equality principles can serve as "backstops" to each other in
the sense that equality analysis helps explain why certain liberties are fundamental and liberty analysis
helps explain why different groups must be treated equally); Kenneth Karst, The Liberties of Equal
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liberty constitute distinct doctrinal categories. The jurisprudence recognizing a
right to privacy in reproductive decision-making does not take into account the
multiple sex equality interests at stake. Equal protection jurisprudence,
likewise, does not address the implications of reproductive liberty for women's
equality. In 2003, the Supreme Court recognized for the first time that the
regulation of pregnant women on the basis of sex-role stereotypes may violate
the Equal Protection Clause. Constitutional doctrine, however, severs the
constitutional right to sex equality from the substantive due process right to
reproductive liberty. This article recovers the history of the labor and social
movement activism yielding the litigation that culminated in LaFleur, which
envisioned sex equality and reproductive liberty as inextricable rights of
citizenship. The article also recovers how the LaFleur decision cautiously
affirmed dimensions of the labor and legal feminist vision, while falling short
of the boldest aspects of that vision.
In the early 1970s, labor and legal feminists argued that sex equality and
reproductive liberty are interdependent conditions of women's full legal
personhood under the Fourteenth Amendment.5 Labor and legal feminists used
evolving antidiscrimination law, in both collective bargaining and litigation
campaigns, to argue for equal employment opportunity and substantive
6reproductive liberty. Public school teachers fought pregnancy dismissal
policies that mandated the termination of pregnant school teachers and
prohibited the return of new mothers to the workplace until several months
after childbirth. Feminists argued that equal employment constituted a fallacy if
premised on foregoing the right to bear children. And, if the law required
women to give up their jobs when they became pregnant, childbearing would
reinforce women's subordination by imposing women's dependence within the
private family.
The majority opinion in LaFleur, although trepid and even evasive in its
language and doctrinal basis, possessed far bolder implications for women's
citizenship status than either the constitutional canon or historical record credits
it with possessing. In striking down pregnancy dismissal policies as
unconstitutional, the decision established a due process right not to be
stereotyped on the basis of pregnancy. Although ostensibly decided upon the
Citizens: Groups and the Due Process Clause, 55 UCLA L. REV. 99, 102 (2007) (arguing that "for a
century, concerns about group subordination have profoundly influenced the doctrinal growth of
substantive due process"); Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the
Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1161, 1170-78 (1988)
(arguing for the superiority of forward-looking equal protection arguments rather than backward-looking
due process arguments).
5. I use the term "legal feminists" to describe activists and attorneys who used the law as a primary
tool to improve women's socioeconomic status.
6. 1 borrow the term "labor feminists" from historian Dorothy Sue Cobble to refer to activists who
fought within their unions to achieve greater power for women within the labor movement, as well as
social and economic rights. See DOROTHY SUE COBBLE, THE OTHER WOMEN'S MOVEMENT:
WORKPLACE JUSTICE AND SOCIAL RIGHTS IN MODERN AMERICA 3 (2005).
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basis of a procedural due process theory, the opinion sparked both criticism and
praise for expanding conceptions of substantive due process. The footnotes and
subtext of the opinion also recognized women's sex equality interests in the
litigation. The history of the LaFleur case recovers a moment at which the
Court contemplated a richer relationship between sex equality and reproductive
liberty than is recognized under contemporary Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence.
Part I discusses the labor and legal feminist campaigns against pregnancy
dismissal policies. The history of labor and legal feminist campaigns reveals
that both union organizing and feminist mobilization catalyzed the
development of sex discrimination law that, in turn, strengthened these
workplace and social movements. Activists within the American Federation of
Teachers, as well as feminist plaintiffs and attorneys, challenged traditional
gender ideals that underpinned the policies, including conservative sexual
norms, stereotypes about pregnant women's lack of capacity to work, and the
family-wage system. That system comprised a cultural ideal, reinforced
through social norms, employer policies, and law that the nuclear family
consists of an independent male wage-earner and dependent female caregiver.7
Labor and legal feminists sought to replace traditional gender ideals with
liberal ideals about sexuality, the treatment of pregnant women as individuals
rather than as a class, and women's right to act as workers as well as mothers.
Feminists, however, argued not only for equal treatment and individual rights
but for more ambitious objectives including paid pregnancy disability leave and
parental leave for both women and men. Teacher activists met with the greatest
resistance from public school administrations in response to these deeper,
redistributive claims. And the same types of challenges ultimately led the
Supreme Court not to decide LaFleur under the Equal Protection Clause and to
cabin its radical implications in subsequent decisions.
Part II analyzes the pregnancy discrimination cases in the lower federal
courts. Plaintiffs, lawyers, and the courts all wrestled with the doctrinal
questions raised by the pregnancy dismissal policies: Were pregnancy-based
classifications under the law synonymous with sex discrimination? What
standard of scrutiny should the courts apply under the Equal Protection Clause
to legal regulation on the basis of sex? Feminists argued that pregnancy
dismissal policies amounted to unconstitutional sex discrimination and urged
federal courts to interpret equal protection in light of developing sex equality
law under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Feminist attorneys also
experimented with the idea that the pregnancy dismissal policies burdened
women's fundamental right to bear children. In 1973, the Court's decision in
Roe v. Wade enacted a revolution in substantive due process, opening the door
7. On the family-wage system, see ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN,
MEN, AND THE QUEST FOR ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA 7 (2001).
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to the argument that women should have a right to bear children parallel to the
right to abortion. This incipient doctrinal trend established the foundation for a
holding that pregnancy dismissal policies threatened women's reproductive
liberty as well as sex equality interests.
Part III considers how the Supreme Court, in deciding LaFleur, negotiated
a complex, dynamic legal landscape ridden with doctrinal and political risks.
Much to feminists' disappointment, the majority opinion did not address the
pregnancy dismissal policies within a sex-equality framework. The Court
avoided two fundamental dilemmas: how to define the relationship between
pregnancy and sex discrimination and whether to apply a strict scrutiny
standard of review to sex under the Equal Protection Clause. Instead, the
majority held that the pregnancy dismissal policies created a series of
unconstitutional "irrebuttable presumptions" that violated women's
fundamental reproductive liberty under the Due Process Clause. While the
irrebuttable presumptions doctrine justifiably drew considerable derision,
LaFleur also held far more serious and potentially radical implications. Most
significantly, the decision embraced a new view of women as independent
citizens in the public sphere rather than as dependents within the private family.
I. THE LABOR AND LEGAL FEMINIST CAMPAIGNS
AGAINST PREGNANCY DISMISSAL POLICIS
When Jo Carol LaFleur and attorney Jane Picker filed suit against the
Cleveland Board of Education, they joined a larger movement for women's
rights. Part I locates the origins of the LaFleur case in the resurgence of a mass
women's movement and labor feminist activism. The social history of the case
reveals a synergy among women workers combating exclusionary employment
rules, growing if tentative union support for women's rights, the rise of a
coterie of feminist attorneys, and new sex discrimination laws.
The synergy between labor, feminism, and law belies the notion that the
advent of antidiscrimination law in the sixties and seventies necessarily
undermined collective action for structural reform.8 Individual litigation did not
supplant union organizing. Rather labor feminists used law, including
administrative guidelines and court decisions, as tools in organizing for sex
equality in the workplace. The growth of feminism as an identity-based
movement did not inhibit unions' critique of political economy. Instead, labor
8. For the argument that Title VII undermined both the labor movement and the intellectual critique
of capitalism, see NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LABOR I -
19, 178-211 (2002). Legal and social historians of civil rights, however, have begun to challenge the
narrative that by the 1960s, a preoccupation with formal, individual rights had replaced a democratic
unionism concerned with economic justice. For a summary of the literature on the subject, see Kenneth
W. Mack, Bringing the Law Back into the History of the Civil Rights Movement, 27 LAW & HIST. REV.
657, 660-61 (2009).
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feminists used growing consciousness of women's rights to critique the
material and social subordination of women within the workplace. Finally,
union activists did not rest content with equal treatment mandates realized
under law but rather mobilized for broader redistributive objectives.
Litigation challenging pregnancy dismissal policies contested the legal
regulation of pregnant workers on the basis of traditional gender ideals. Brave
plaintiffs and their pioneering lawyers, including LaFleur, Picker, and others,
identified employer regulations excluding childbearing women from the
workplace as the foundation for gender hierarchy. Pregnancy dismissal policies
implicated traditional social ideals rooted in conservative responses to female
sexuality, the protection of white women, and the family-wage system. The
policies relegated childbearing women to socioeconomic dependence within the
private family, denying them the right to act as autonomous and equal
individuals in the sphere of labor market competition. This Part examines labor
and legal feminist efforts to challenge the social ideals that undergirded
pregnancy dismissal policies and to replace them with new liberal principles
underpinning antidiscrimination law. The Part conducts close historical case
studies of labor feminist organizing within the American Federation of
Teachers (AFT) and the district court hearing in LaFleur v. Cleveland Board of
Education.
A. Courts, Teachers, and Unions
Pregnancy discrimination cases mushroomed in the federal district courts
during the early 1970s. Before 1971, no cases in the federal district courts
challenged pregnancy discrimination in employment, under either the U.S.
Constitution or Title VII. That year, federal district courts decided seven
pregnancy discrimination cases; in 1972, they decided nine more cases;1o in
1973, another three new cases;" in 1974, an additional seven;12 and in 1975
9. Struck v. Sec'y of Def., 460 F.2d 1372, 1374 (9th Cir. 1971) (discussing the district court's
dismissal of the case); Doe v. Osteopathic Hosp., 333 F. Supp. 1357 (D. Kan. 1971); Jinks v. Mays, 332
F. Supp. 254 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Cohen v. Chesterfield Cnty. Sch. Bd., 326 F. Supp. 1159 (E.D. Va.
1971); LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 326 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1971); Schattman v. Tex.
Emp't Comm'n, 330 F. Supp. 328 (W.D. Tex. 1971); Robinson v. Rand, No. C-2746, 1971 WL 115 (D.
Colo. Jan. 13, 1971).
10. Buckley v. Coyle Pub. Sch. Sys., 476 F.2d 92, 94 (10th Cit. 1973) (discussing the district
court's dismissal of action); Gutierrez v. Laird, 346 F. Supp. 289 (D.D.C. 1972); Bravo v. Bd. of Educ.,
345 F. Supp. 155 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Heath v. Westerville Bd. of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 501 (S.D. Ohio
1972); Pocklington v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd., 345 F. Supp. 163 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Green v. Waterford Bd.
of Educ., 349 F. Supp. 687 (D. Conn. 1972); Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 357 F. Supp. 1051
(S.D.N.Y. 1972); Williams v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Guelich v.
Mounds View Indep. Pub. Sch. Dist., 334 F. Supp. 1276 (D. Minn. 1972).
11. Newmon v. Delta Air Lines, 374 F. Supp. 238 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Aiello v. Hansen, 359 F. Supp.
792 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Seaman v. Spring Lake Park Indep. Sch. Dist., 363 F. Supp. 944 (D. Minn. 1973).
12. Vineyard v. Hollister, 64 F.R.D. 580 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Commc'n Workers of Am. v. Am. Tel.
& Tel. Co., 379 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Crawford v. Cushman, 378 F. Supp. 717 (N.D. Vt.
1974); Scott v. Opelika City Sch., 63 F.R.D. 144 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Singer v. Mahoning Cnty. Bd. of
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two more. Plaintiffs brought claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and Section 1983,14 as well as under Title VII. s
Teachers were especially active in challenging pregnancy discrimination, and
statutory claims proliferated after Congress extended Title VII to educational
institutions in 1972.16
The ascendance of women's rights organizing within teacher unions
catalyzed the emergence of the pregnancy discrimination cases. Of the twenty-
eight cases decided in the lower federal courts between 1971 and 1974, sixty
percent had teacher plaintiffs.17 The history of labor feminist activism thus
provides crucial context for understanding why cases challenging pregnancy
discrimination arose in the early 1970s. This history also highlights the
difficulty of translating the socioeconomic grievances, which lay behind court
cases such as LaFleur, into legal claims. We learn what gets lost in that process
of translation. Activists within teacher unions did not argue for only an end to
pregnancy dismissal policies but also for broader objectives, including paid
pregnancy disability and parental leave. These claims extended beyond
evolving sex discrimination standards to pose deeper challenges to public
school administration.
Labor feminist ideology and activism had flourished in the decades
between the New Deal and the civil rights era. During this period, women
workers struggled within their unions for "full industrial citizenship," which
entailed both "the right to market work for all women" and the "social rights . .
. necessary for a life apart from wage work, including the right to care for
one's family."18 Labor feminists campaigned for rights to equal pay, maternity
leave, state and federal funding of childcare centers, and shorter and more
flexible work hours, among other entitlements.19
In the late sixties, a new vision for sex equality articulated by the mass
feminist movement, which centered on individual self-determination and equal
employment opportunity, sparked a crisis within labor feminism. The newly
enacted Title VII and the proposed Equal Rights Amendment rendered suspect
Mental Retardation, 379 F. Supp. 986 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Hutchison v. Lake Oswego Sch. Dist., 374 F.
Supp. 1056 (D. Or. 1974); Farkas v. Sw. City Sch. Dist., No. C2 73-169, 1974 WL 225 (S.D. Ohio
1974).
13. Paxman v. Wilkerson, 390 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Va. 1975); Sale v. Waverly-Shell Rock Bd. of
Educ., 390 F. Supp. 784 (N.D. Iowa 1975).
14. See, e.g., Williams, 340 F. Supp. at 440; Jinks, 332 F. Supp. at 256.
15. See, e.g., Hutchison, 374 F. Supp. at 1057; Doe v. Osteopathic Hosp., 333 F. Supp. 1357, 1358
(D. Kan. 1971).
16. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103.
17. The state action doctrine cannot account fully for the predominance of teacher plaintiffs. The
Constitution only constrains public actors, and far more women during the early seventies worked as
teachers than in any other form of public employment. Plaintiffs also brought pregnancy discrimination
cases, however, under Title VII, which reached private employers and, after March 1972, educational
institutions and local, state, and federal governments.
18. COBBLE, supra note 6, at 4.
19. Id.at5-6.
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the continued legality of sex-specific labor standards. Some labor activists
agreed with the consensus within the broader feminist movement that these
"protective laws" discriminatorily excluded women from employment
opportunities. 20 Other labor activists argued that the laws offered genuine and
essential protection to low-income women workers who not only comprised the
least organized, lowest paid, and most vulnerable sectors of the workforce, but
who also faced the double burden of work in the home at the end of their paid
workday.21 By the early 1970s, however, lawsuits under Title VII as well as
preemptive administrative and legislative action had eroded the protective
laws.22 With the major ideological and political obstacle to labor support
23removed, the Equal Rights Amendment became a union demand.
The issues surrounding pregnancy in the workplace rested at the
intersection of labor feminists' older commitment to social protection and their
newer commitment to sex equality. Labor feminists in the early seventies
mobilized for both antidiscrimination laws and affirmative entitlements related
to pregnancy. They realized that the gendered rhetoric of social protection,
which had long justified both restrictions and privileges unique to women
workers,4 rang hollow when it came to the very reproductive functions that
25
purportedly necessitated state intervention. Labor feminists desired both the
opportunity to work and the benefits that would enable their ongoing economic
independence when they decided to bear children. They fought for the right not
to have to choose between paid employment and motherhood. They pursued
both equal employment opportunity and reproductive liberty.
Under the leadership of the American Federation of Teachers Women's
Rights Committee Chair Marjorie Stem, feminist activists within Federation
locals targeted restrictive maternity leave clauses as priorities for change. Stern
20. See, e.g., Arlene Van Breems, Working Women Caught in State and Federal Law Bind, L.A.
TIMEs, Nov. 12, 1969, at HI (statement of Aileen Hernandez, former West Coast Education Director for
the International Ladies Garment Workers Union and one of the original five commissioners for the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, critiquing California protective laws at public hearings in
1969: "I don't really need your gallantry or your protection.").
21. See, e.g., Harry Bernstein, Debate Grows over Job Discrimination Due to Ser, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 7, 1966, at Al ("[W]oman's role and responsibilities in our culture are not the same as those of the
male ... . She may be gainfully employed but at the same time be a wife, mother, homemaker, nurse or
any combination of these at different stages of her life." (quoting Ruth Miller of the Amalgamated
Clothing Workers)); Nat'l Consumers League, Statement on State Protective Labor Legislation 1-2 (Jan.
1967) (Catherine East Papers, box 16, folder 18) (on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe
Institute, Harvard University) (arguing that women comprise the most vulnerable sector of the
workforce).
22. For further discussion, see Deborah Dinner, Debating Protective Legislation: The Origins of a
Legal Sex/Gender Distinction, 1964-1974 (2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
23. COBBLE, supra note 6, at 190-95.
24. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 423 (1908) (upholding the constitutionality of a state
maximum hours law for women).
25. Elizabeth Duncan Koontz, Childbirth and Childrearing Leave: Job Related Benefits, 17 N.Y. L.
FORUM 480, 482 (1971) ("Contrary to popular belief, the state laws singling out maternity for special
treatment in employment all are exclusionary or restrictive.").
2010] 351
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
and other teachers drew on a long tradition of activism. Women had formed the
more radical wing of the AFT since the Progressive era, when they opposed the
pro-war unionism and red-baiting tactics of conservative elements of the
union.26 The problem of sex discrimination was nothing new, either. During the
Depression, in the context of widespread unemployment among men viewed as
legitimate breadwinners, hostility to married women's workforce participation
had heightened. School boards across the nation had resorted to a practice of
firing married female teachers and hiring single ones. The AFT responded by
fighting within their unions and the courts to protect the tenure of married
teachers, and the practice subsided when World War II caused labor
27shortages. The question of women's rights remained significant for women
AFT activists, some of whom gained appointments to President Kennedy's
Commission on the Status of Women in the early sixties.2 8
The legacy of support for sex equality and extant resistance to change in
gender roles shaped the relationship among female teachers, union organizing,
and litigation. In part, activist sentiment within the teacher unions, including
the AFT and the National Education Association, catalyzed rights
consciousness among women teachers. Union activists in locals supportive to
women's rights used law-including administrative regulations, litigation, and
court decisions-to pursue reform of maternity provisions in teacher contracts
via the collective bargaining process. Union intransigence also led women to
the courts. Thus, law served as at once a backstop to union locals' failure to
support women's rights, a byproduct of feminist activism within unions, and a
tool enabling labor feminist organizing.
B. Reforming Maternity Leave: The American Federation Teachers and Labor
Feminism
In the early 1970s, public school systems across the country excluded
pregnant women and new mothers from the workplace. A National Education
Association Survey in 1970 found that most school systems required teachers
to take mandatory, unpaid maternity leaves at the beginning of the fourth or
fifth month of pregnancy, often without any job guarantee.29 Some school
systems required female teachers to remain on leave for a full year following
childbirth. 30 For women teachers, pregnancy dismissal policies meant the loss
of wages and benefits just at the time when they were needed the most. For
26. MARJORIE MURPHY, BLACKBOARD UNIONS: THE AFT AND TiH NEA, 1900-1980, at 55-65
(1990).
27. Id. at 177-79.
28. Id.
29. Koontz, supra note 25, at 492.
30. Id.
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some, the dismissal policies mean the end of a teaching career. The policies
conditioned employment on the disavowal of childbearing, forcing women to
choose between work and motherhood.
The pregnancy dismissal policies embodied traditional ideals about
sexuality, pregnancy, and gender roles. First, the dismissal policies suggested
that pregnancy, as a visual representation of female sexuality, represented an
inappropriate presence in the classroom. Second, the dismissal policies
reflected an entrenched public opinion, which the medical profession had only
just begun to challenge, that pregnant women could not continue to work past
the mid-point of their pregnancies without jeopardizing the health of
themselves or their fetuses. Third, in relegating both pregnant women and new
mothers to the home, the dismissal policies imposed the family-wage system.
Pregnancy dismissal policies denied childbearing women access to the financial
and social benefits of paid employment, enforcing their socioeconomic
dependence within the private family.
As Chair of the American Federation of Teachers Women's Rights
Committee, Marjorie Stem made reforming maternity leave clauses her top
priority. In August 1970, the AFT passed an historic resolution at its national
convention stating that there should be "no loss of rights for teachers on
maternity leave, that the length of leave be established between the teacher and
her physician, that there be provision for continual educational training of
women teachers on leave .. . .1 Marjorie Stern argued that maternity leave
should be fixed by a woman and her physician, allowing pregnant teachers and
new mothers who were capable of working, needed their salaries, and wanted
to work, to continue teaching. Stem argued further that pregnant teachers
should be able to use accumulated sick and personal leave for pregnancy- and
childbirth-related leave; that pregnancy should not be an occasion for loss of
seniority credit or other employment and contract rights; and that school
districts should pay for the medical expenses of childbirth.32
The maternity issue held further potential as a concrete organizing tool.
Liberalizing maternity clauses appealed to the large numbers of young women
among the teaching workforce. Beginning in 1971, Stern initiated a steady
stream of communication with the leaders of nascent local women's rights
committees. Stem urged activists to focus on reforming school board maternity
31. Resolution Passed at AFT National Convention, Pittsburgh, Pa. (1970) (Marjorie Stem Papers,
Part I, box 2, folder 2) (on file with the Walter Reuther Library, Wayne State University Archive of
Labor & Urban Affairs).
32. See Letter from Marjorie Stern to Editor, Seattle Times (Mar. 20, 1972) (Marjorie Stem Papers,
Part I, box 5, folder 5) (on file with the Walter Reuther Library, Wayne State University Archive of
Labor & Urban Affairs); Marjorie Stern, Statement to the Wash. State Human Rights Comm'n
Regarding Proposed Rules for Maternity Provisions for Women Workers Implementing the Law Against
Discrimination in Emp't Because of Sex, Chapter 49.60 RCW (Marjorie Stem Papers, Part I, box 5,
folder 5) (on file with the Walter Reuther Library, Wayne State University Archive of Labor & Urban
Affairs).
2010] 353
354 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 22:2
provisions as a means of strengthening the women's rights voice within the
AFT and building the union as a whole.33 Stem repeatedly argued that
improving maternity policies constituted a tangible, popular goal "which your
local can possibly accomplish in a relatively short time." 34
1. The Liberalization of Maternity Provisions in Teacher Contracts
In the early 1970s, Marjorie Stern, the AFT Women's Rights Committee,
and local activists endeavored to end pregnancy dismissal policies and to
bargain for alternative contract provisions consistent with emergent
antidiscrimination principles. Ideological and personal ties between teacher
unionists and feminist organizations nurtured women's rights activism within
the Federation. Stern described the "plantation psychology" dominant in
schools, which rewarded teacher "passivity, self-sacrifice," and acceptance of
"hierarchy."35 A school administrator "may be tyrannical, or benevolent, or
blandly paternalistic, but it is through him that teachers seek their identity, just
as women do through their fathers or husbands, and similar to what blacks were
forced to do through the master-slave relationship."3 6 Stem concluded, "Here is
where ideas of the women's and black liberation movements parallel the
teacher rights movement."37 The parallels took concrete form via AFT
members also active within feminist organizations. These women demanded
that public schools "become more concerned with the feminist point of view."38
They used the Federation as a resource in support of local National
Organization for Women chapter campaigns against school boards. 39 An
33. See, e.g., Letter from Francine Hare, Ashland High Sch., to Marjorie Stem, Chairwoman,
Women's Rights Comm., Am. Fed'n of Teachers (Dec. 28, 1972) (Marjorie Stem Papers, Part II, box 5,
folder 6) (on file with the Walter Reuther Library, Wayne State University Archive of Labor & Urban
Affairs); Letter from Ferda E. Stanley, Anderson Fed'n of Teachers, to Marjorie Stem, Chairwoman,
Women's Rights Comm., Am. Fed'n of Teachers (Jan. 22, 1973) (Marjorie Stem Papers, Part II, box 5,
folder 6) (on file with the Walter Reuther Library, Wayne State University Archive of Labor & Urban
Affairs); Letter from Marjorie Stem, Chairwoman, Women's Rights Comm., Am. Fed'n of Teachers, to
Francine Hare, Ashland High Sch. (Feb. 16, 1973) (Marjorie Stem Papers, Part II, box 5, folder 6) (on
file with the Walter Reuther Library, Wayne State University Archive of Labor & Urban Affairs); Letter
from Marjorie Stem, Chairwoman, Women's Rights Comm., Am. Fed'n of Teachers, to Ferda E.
Stanley, Anderson Fed'n of Teachers (Feb. 16, 1973) (Marjorie Stem Papers, Part II, box 5, folder 6)
(on file with the Walter Reuther Library, Wayne State University Archive of Labor & Urban Affairs).
34. Marjorie Stem, Setting Goals for Local Women's Rights Committees Using AFT Policy as a
Guide 2 (Marjorie Stem Papers, Part II, box 2, folder 11) (on file with the Walter Reuther Library,
Wayne State University Archive of Labor & Urban Affairs).




38. Letter from Frances C. Viturac, Teacher, Clayton Sch., to Marjorie Stem, Chairwoman,
Women's Rights Comm., Am. Fed'n of Teachers (Jan. 24, 1972) (Marjorie Stern Papers, Part I, box 5,
folder 5) (on file with the Walter Reuther Library, Wayne State University Archive of Labor & Urban
Affairs).
39. Letter from Joyce Sullivan, President, San Joaquin Cnty. Chapter, Nat'l Org. for Women, to
Marjorie Stem, Chairwoman, Women's Rights Comm., Am. Fed'n of Teachers (Dec. 20, 1971)
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outreach advertisement for a northern Minnesota local read like a radical
feminist newsletter: "How many of you are working for power-mongering or at
the least, antagonistic school boards . . . ? In your community are you
considered a strange woman, a bitch, a man-hater, etc., because you believe in
and work for human equality and totally reject the discriminating stereotypes
under which both sexes suffer . .. ?"40
AFT activists argued that the cultural representation of pregnancy as an
embodiment of sexuality, verboten within the classroom, perpetuated archaic
stereotypes. Eileen Rossi, a professor of Sociology at the City College of San
Francisco advised the city's AFT local, which in 1967 became the first to
attempt to reform contractual maternity provisions. According to Rossi, schools
treated a pregnant teacher as "a thing to be put away and talked as little about
for her nine months of 'deformity' [as possible]." 4 1 Rossi drew on ideas about
social progress to delegitimize pregnancy dismissal policies. She described the
impulse to sequester pregnant women as "akin to the isolation of women in
primitive tribes during certain times of the month." 42 Cultural stereotypes
marking pregnancy as simultaneously shameful, selfish, and incompatible with
employment had no place in the modern, civilized school.
The connection between pregnancy dismissal policies and traditional
sexual morality manifested, too, in the policies' treatment of single versus
married women. The Cleveland policy that Jo Carol LaFleur would challenge
exemplified many similar policies, which excluded unmarried pregnant women
from even the meager job tenure protections offered to married women forced
to take unpaid maternity leave. The marital issue arose in hearings before the
Washington State Human Rights Commission to determine whether the state
should require employers to cover pregnancy within their leave and benefit
policies applicable to sickness and temporary disability. Opponents argued that
even if employers had to extend such pregnancy-related benefits to married
women, unmarried women should not be extended the same benefits.43 In
(Marjorie Stern Papers, Part H, box 5, folder 5) (on file with the Walter Reuther Library, Wayne State
University Archive of Labor & Urban Affairs).
40. Minn. Fed'n of Teachers, Are You One?, WOMAN WRITES (Marjorie Stem Papers, Part I, box 3,
folder 11) (on file with the Walter Reuther Library, Wayne State University Archive of Labor & Urban
Affairs).
41. Letter from Alfred J. Tapson, President, S.F. Fed'n of Teachers, to Eileen Rossi, Professor of
Sociology, City Coll. of S.F. (June 26, 1967) (Marjorie Stem Papers, Part II, box 1, folder 16) (on file
with the Walter Reuther Library, Wayne State University Archive of Labor & Urban Affairs) (attaching
Memorandum from Eileen Rossi, Professor of Sociology, City Coll. of S.F., Proposal for Changes in the
Existing District Policies Regarding Maternity Leaves 1).
42. Id.
43. See Memorandum from Isabelle G. Rosenfels, Supervisor, Div. of Sex & Age Discrimination,
Wash. State Human Rights Comm'n, to Marjorie Stem, Field Representative, Seattle Fed'n of Teachers
(Mar. 10, 1972) (Marjorie Stem Papers, Part I, box 5, folder 5) (on file with the Walter Reuther Library,
Wayne State University Archive of Labor & Urban Affairs).
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testimony before the Human Rights Commission and in a letter to the editor of
the Seattle Times, Stern railed against school boards' "Victorian policies." 44
In addition to combating the conservative sexual mores undergirding
pregnancy dismissal policies, AFT activists marshaled evolving medical
standards to counter the stereotype that pregnant women lacked the capacity to
work. The San Francisco Unified School District required married pregnant
teachers to take a minimum of three months' leave before childbirth. 45 Eileen
Rossi attributed the requirement to fear of liability for injury to a pregnant
woman during the last three months of fetal development. The school district's
position represented a common argument at a time when many doctors and the
public generally believed that pregnancy made work hazardous for women.
Rossi countered this concern by citing an obstetrics professor at Johns Hopkins
University, Nicholson J. Eastman, who believed that pregnant women could
continue to work in jobs that did not inordinately tax them physically, for as
long as they desired. Rossi argued that with the exception of physical education
teachers and women experiencing particularly dangerous pregnancies,
maternity leave should be placed "at the discretion of the prospective mother
and her doctor." 46
AFT activists also challenged the prohibition on teachers' return to work
following childbirth. They argued that the regulation of women's return to the
workplace derived from the cultural ideal that new mothers belonged in the
home. This ideal conflated women's role as childbearers with their primary
responsibility for childrearing. By contrast, feminist activists within the AFT
embraced an emerging distinction between the biological and social dimensions
of reproduction. That distinction played a critical role in feminist thought. For
example, the radical feminist leader Ti-Grace Atkinson argued that women
experienced subordination as a political class because society made
childrearing and domestic work women's primary social function.4 7
In arguing for liberalized regulations respecting pregnancy, the AFT took
advantage of new Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
guidelines on sex discrimination issued in April 1972. The guidelines
interpreted Title VII to require employers to treat "[d]isabilities caused or
contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion, childbirth, and recovery
therefrom" as temporary disabilities for job-related purposes. 48 The EEOC
guidelines represented the culmination of a near-decade of deliberation and
evolution in EEOC policy on pregnancy-based sex discrimination. Initially,
44. Letter from Marjorie Stern to Editor, Seattle Times, supra note 32; Stern, supra note 32.
45. The policy also required women to refrain from returning to work within the six-month period
following childbirth. Memorandum from Eileen Rossi, supra note 41, at 1.
46. Id. at 3.
47. Ti-Grace Atkinson, Radical Feminism, NOTES FROM THE SECOND YEAR: WOMEN'S
LIBERATION, MAJOR WRITINGS OF THE RADICAL FEMINISTS (Women's Liberation Movement, New
York, N.Y.), 1970, at 32, 34.
48. EEOC Employment Policies Relating to Pregnancy and Childbirth, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1972).
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following the passage of Title VII, the General Counsel's Office within the
EEOC issued decisions treating pregnancy as a unique condition not governed
by the general legal principles regulating employer personnel policies. Some
decisions concluded that employers' exclusion of pregnancy-related disability
from temporary disability benefits did not constitute unlawful sex
discrimination. Other decisions concluded that Title VII required employers to
provide maternity leave regardless of the leave extended for other temporarily
disabling conditions.49
By 1970, women's rights reformers outside the EEOC had developed a
new principled approach to regulating pregnancy in the workplace. The
Citizens' Advisory Council on the Status of Women issued a critical statement
that year: "Childbirth and complications of pregnancy are, for all job-related
purposes, temporary disabilities and should be treated as such under any health
insurance, temporary disability insurance, or sick leave plan of an employer,
union, or fraternal society."50 The sex/gender distinction important to feminist
theory at the time played a crucial role in the development of the temporary
disability paradigm. Jacqueline Gutwillig, the Chair of the Citizens' Advisory
Council on the Status of Women, considered the "semantic separation"
between childbearing and childrearing "one of the most important contributions
of our [the Council's] consideration of this issue . . . ."st In addition, the
temporary disability paradigm affirmed the principle that pregnant women
should be treated as individuals, not as a class, by requiring an individual
evaluation of a pregnant woman's capacity to work. Furthermore, the model
had appeal because it would offer replacement income to pregnant women and
women recovering from childbirth, who were physically unable to work, within
a sex-neutral framework that dodged the pitfalls of protective legislation.52
The National Organization for Women (NOW), which had formed four
years earlier to pressure the EEOC to enforce the sex provision of Title VII,
also began to advocate for the temporary disability model. A couple of feminist
attorneys on staff with the EEOC, Susan Deller Ross and Sonia Pressman
49. For a comprehensive discussion of the evolution of EEOC policy regarding pregnancy
discrimination, see Kevin S. Schwartz, Equalizing Pregnancy: The Birth of a Super-Statute (Yale Law
Sch. Legal Scholarship Repository, Student Prize Paper No. 41, 2005), available at
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edulylssppspapers/41.
50. Memorandum from Jacqueline G. Gutwillig, Chairman, Citizens' Advisory Council on the
Status of Women, to the Under Secretary of the U.S. Dep't of Labor, Recommendations of the Citizens'
Advisory Council on the Status of Women at Our October 28-29 Meeting 1 (Nov. 2, 1970) (on file with
the Sterling Memorial Library at Yale University).
51. CITIZENS' ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, WOMEN IN 1971, at 54 (1972); see
also Hearing on Maternity Leave Before the Wis. Dep't of Indus., Labor, and Human Relations 2 (May
4, 1972) (Statement of Catherine East, Exec. Sec'y, Citizens' Advisory Council on the Status of
Women) (Catherine East Papers, box 5, folder 25) (on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe
Institute, Harvard University) (portraying the distinction between childbirth and childrearing as the
Citizens' Advisory Council's "chief contribution" to the subject of maternity and work).
52. For further discussion, see Deborah Dinner, The Costs of Reproduction: History and the Legal
Construction ofSex Equality, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).
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Fuentes, urged the agency to modify its stance on pregnancy discrimination.
As a result of both external and internal advocacy, the EEOC stance on
pregnancy discrimination evolved and culminated in the 1972 guidelines. 54
While NOW saw the EEOC guidelines as the basis for equal employment
litigation, the American Federation of Teachers viewed them as leverage for
collective bargaining with school boards. Stern admonished that most districts'
maternity leave policies "are not only antiquated . . . and paternalistically
applied, but . . . [also] are fast becoming illegal."5  Stem, however, encouraged
locals to bargain for pregnancy, childbearing, and childrearing policies that
surpassed the EEOC guidelines. 56 While the guidelines provided a floor, Stern
argued that locals should ensure that revised contract provisions "substantially
improve the conditions under which a woman takes leave."5 7 Stem and local
activists viewed law as a tool with which to pursue collective bargaining, not as
a limit on the labor feminist vision for sex equality.
2. The Limits of Reform
Liberalizing maternity provisions in teacher contracts to allow pregnant
women and new mothers to work when capable would make significant
advances toward, but would not realize, sex equality. Equal employment
opportunity, feminists believed, would also require temporary disability
benefits for pregnancy-related disability and paid parental leave available to
both male and female workers. These objectives demonstrated that labor
feminists pursued a far more ambitious agenda than merely assimilationist,
formal equality. Instead, they pursued a more equitable distribution of
childrearing between women and men within the home, as well as a shift of the
costs of reproduction from the private family to the larger public. Labor
feminists achieved the most success, however, when combating market-
irrational employment discrimination. They faced considerably more difficulty
transforming public school administration in a manner that would impose
significant costs on school boards.
The allocation to the private family of the economic costs of pregnancy,
childbirth, and childrearing buttressed the family-wage system. The exclusion
of pregnancy from temporary disability coverage drew legitimacy from the
53. For further discussion of the tension between the solutions posed by Ross and Fuentes, as well
as the resolution of that conflict within the EEOC, see id.
54. See Schwartz, supra note 49.
55. Stern, supra note 34, at 2.
56. See Letter from Marjorie Stem, Chairwoman, Women's Rights Comm., Am. Fed'n of Teachers,
to Evie Unkefer (June 25, 1973) (Marjorie Stern Papers, Part II, box 5, folder 11) (on file with the
Walter Reuther Library, Wayne State University Archive of Labor & Urban Affairs).
57. Marjorie Stem & Nancy Kaye, Am. Fed'n of Teachers Comm. for Women's Rights, A Guide
for Improving Maternity Leave, or Pregnancy, Childbirth, and Child Rearing Leave Contract Clauses
(AFT Office of the President Collection, 1960-74, box 6, folder 23) (on file with the Walter Reuther
Library, Wayne State University Archive of Labor & Urban Affairs).
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notion that women did not work to support their families. Women, employers
alleged, did not deserve the same benefits that breadwinning men deserved,
during periods of women's economic dependence.59 School boards denied
pregnant women access to the social insurance protections and entitlements
offered for other forms of human dependence and flourishing including paid
sickness, disability, and vacation leave. Demographic change, however, had
made the family-wage ideal ever more illusory for most American families.
Single women, especially, could not rely on men's salaries but rather needed to
earn income during pregnancy and to receive income replacement when
pregnancy or childbirth yielded periods of physical incapacity.6 0
The denial of paid parental leave reinforced a gender inequitable division
of childrearing labor within the home. Employers routinely denied men
childcare leave on the assumption that men did not need to serve as primary
caregivers. Even when employers offered parental leave to both male and
female employees, it was most often unpaid. That made it more difficult for
feminists to achieve an equitable division of childrearing labor between the
sexes. In the majority of married couples, men earned higher incomes than their
wives. Therefore, economic incentives made it more rational for women than
men to take parental leave to serve as primary caregivers. Making parental
leave paid would encourage a more gender equitable division of childrearing
responsibility within the family by offering incentives to male leave-taking.
By late spring of 1972, Stern had identified a shift in local contracts'
language "from 'maternity leave' to 'disability leave' and 'child rearing'
leave."61 The new language represented a discursive trend away from
constructing childcare as a need of women toward the legal separation of
biological from social reproduction. The Federation used the distinction
between childbirth and childrearing to argue that childrearing and adoption
leaves should be extended to men.62
Fathers who fought school boards to gain access to childcare leave faced
strong resistance, but also met with some success. Gary Ackerman, for
example, encountered numerous obstacles to obtaining childcare leave from his
job as a teacher with the New York City schools, until his local successfully
58. See Memorandum from Isabelle G. Rosenfels to Marjorie Stern, supra note 43 (stating that
"maximum opposition to the maternity leave proposal" of the Washington State Human Rights
Commission would likely concern "the use of accrued sick, disability, and vacation leave days toward
maternity leave. . . .").
59. For further discussion, see Dinner, supra note 52.
60. On the limits of the family-wage ideal for single and low-income women, including most
families of color, see NANCY MACLEAN, FREEDOM IS NOT ENOUGH: THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN
wORKPLACE 16-17 (2006).
61. Letter from Marjorie Stem, Seattle Fed'n of Teachers, to John Oliver, Dir., Dep't of Collective
Bargaining Servs., Am. Fed'n of Teachers (May 15, 1972) (Marjorie Stern Papers, Part I, box 4, folder
18) (on file with the Walter Reuther Library, Wayne State University Archive of Labor & Urban
Affairs).
62. Stern & Kaye, supra note 57.
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bargained for childcare leave.63 Word of Ackerman's struggle inspired Seattle
teacher Vernon Olsen. Olsen "looked at the Equal Rights Amendment" and
asked himself, "If a female could take a year off for child-rearing, why couldn't
a male?"64 When Olsen first applied for leave, the school board offered only
maternity leave and stated he would need to resign if he wanted to take time off
from work. The next year, teachers negotiated a new contract including
childcare leave. The district still needed some convincing. But after a grievance
hearing in which the Seattle Federation of Teachers sided with Olsen, the
school district agreed to grant a one-year paternity leave. Olsen dropped the
charges he had filed with the Washington State Human Rights Commission.
His story featured as the lead article on the front page of the Seattle Times, the
newspaper with the largest circulation in the state.65
Feminist activists within the AFT ran into the greatest resistance from both
the national Federation and union locals when they began to demand paid
parental leaves and pregnancy disability benefits. At the 1972 AFT convention,
Stern failed in her third consecutive attempt to achieve a national resolution in
favor of paid maternity benefits. 66 Her proposal for paid parental leave for
fathers of newborns similarly met defeat. Stern noted that opposition usually
came from "those locals which have successfully negotiated contracts, have
state collective bargaining laws, and have had to make priority choices in actual
bargaining situations." 67 Although their objections might have been "somewhat
more realistic," Stem nevertheless pledged to continue advocating for benefits
"either at the bargaining table or the convention floor."6 8 The locals' reluctance
suggests that many Federation members proved willing to support women's
rights so long as they did not have a cost. They were unwilling to negotiate for
paid pregnancy and parental leave benefits if that might mean sacrificing
another contract item.
A few locals with particularly active women's rights contingents strove
valiantly to win inclusion of pregnancy and childrearing leave within paid leave
63. See Letter from Marjorie Stern, Chairwoman, Women's Rights Comm., Am. Fed'n of Teachers,
to Sandra Feldman, Dir. of Staff, United Fed'n of Teachers (Oct. 22, 1973) (Marjorie Stem Papers, Part
II, box 5, folder 16) (on file with the Walter Reuther Library, Wayne State University Archive of Labor
& Urban Affairs).
64. Constantine Angelos, City Schools Grant First Paternity Leave, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 5, 1974,
at I (quoting Vernon Olsen).
65. Id.
66. See Maternity or Parental Leave, reprinted from AFT NEGOTIATIONS MANUAL (1972)
(Marjorie Stem Papers, Part I, box 4, folder 7) (on file with the Walter Reuther Library, Wayne State
University Archive of Labor & Urban Affairs); Resolutions Presented to the Fifty-Sixth Annual
Convention of the American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO (Aug. 21-25, 1972) (Marjorie Stern
Papers, Part I, box 2, folder 10) (on file with the Walter Reuther Library, Wayne State University
Archive of Labor & Urban Affairs); Letter from Marjorie Stem, Chairwoman, Women's Rights Comm.,
Am. Fed'n of Teachers, to Miles Myers, Editor, Cal. Teacher (Oct. 31, 1972) (Marjorie Stem Papers,
Part II, box 5, folder 2) (on file with the Walter Reuther Library, Wayne State University Archive of
Labor & Urban Affairs).
67. Letter from Marjorie Stem to Miles Myers, supra note 66.
68. Id.
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systems. But school districts often stymied their efforts because of the benefits'
anticipated expense. For example, although San Francisco teachers had
negotiated for a variety of insurance policies, Stern wrote in January 1973 that
the union had not achieved paid maternity leaves. The union would first have to
negotiate for paid disability insurance, which would in turn include maternity in
its coverage. This type of insurance, however, proved a challenging item to
bargain for, because it was both more expensive and less comprehensive than
other types of policies such as life and long-term disability insurance. Some
activists advanced ideas for alternative mechanisms to achieve paid leave for
childbearing and childrearing, other than temporary disability benefits.70 One
union local advocated grouping numerous types of leaves-sabbatical, personal
necessity, medical, and maternity-under the general label of sick leave, made
categorically available to teachers. 7 1 Another local bargained for hospital,
medical, and surgical insurance covering all gynecological and obstetrical
services for female members of the bargaining unit.72 All these innovative
proposals represented seeds of change that never came to fruition.
The labor feminist initiatives within the AFT that never fully flowered
were those that posed the deepest redistributive challenge to public school
administration. Allowing pregnant teachers to continue teaching so long as they
remained healthy and to return to work sooner did not tax school district
budgets. Allowing both male and female teachers to take unpaid childrearing
leaves posed only a minimal economic burden. In short, labor feminists
achieved reform of maternity leave policies to the extent that new, liberalized
contract provisions better integrated female workers into a capitalist economy.
Feminist attempts to transform that economy to provide greater financial
support for childbearing and early months of childrearing met with profound
resistance.
Momentum for change came to a halt with the premature end to Stern's
career as Chair of the Women's Rights Committee. In Autumn 1974, the
American Federation of Teachers held a bitterly contested election for the
national presidency between the six-year incumbent David Selden and Albert
69. See Letter from Marjorie Stem, Chairwoman, Women's Rights Comm., Am. Fed'n of Teachers,
to Sheila P. Gold, Local 1902 (Jan. 17, 1973) (Marjorie Stern Papers, Part II, box 5, folder 5) (on file
with the Walter Reuther Library, Wayne State University Archive of Labor & Urban Affairs).
70. See Letter from Sheila P. Gold, Local 1902, to Marjorie Stern, Chairwoman, Women's Rights
Comm., Am. Fed'n of Teachers (Dec. 6, 1972) (Marjorie Stem Papers, Part II, box 5, folder 5) (on file
with the Walter Reuther Library, Wayne State University Archive of Labor & Urban Affairs)
(discussing the potential for a school district to purchase insurance for paid maternity leave).
71. Only a Fall Day in Vermont, AFT SIDE (E. San Jose Fed'n of Teachers, Am. Fed'n of
Teachers), Mar. 4, 1975 (Marjorie Stern Papers, Part I, box 5, folder 11) (on file with the Walter Reuther
Library, Wayne State University Archive of Labor & Urban Affairs).
72. SHELI A. LULKIN, CHI. TEACHERS UNION COLLECTIVE BARGAINING COMM., WOMEN'S RIGHTS
AND WELFARE SUBCOMM., WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND THE CHICAGO TEACHERS UNION (1972) (Marjorie
Stern Papers, Part 1, box 2, folder 13) (on file with the Walter Reuther Library, Wayne State University
Archive of Labor & Urban Affairs).
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Shanker, the president of New York City's United Federation of Teachers. The
Selden-Shanker feud concerned whether the AFT should either continue to
pursue Selden's vision of the union as a liberal political force working for
social justice, or embrace the more conservative vision of bread-and-butter
unionism heralded by Shanker. For Stem, Selden's defeat meant the loss of a
sympathetic national leader.73 Support for women's rights had already waned
within the union; Stern had to fight to get a workshop entitled Women's Rights
as a Bargaining Tool on the schedule for the 1974 convention.74 That
September, the Federation's Executive Committee declined Stem's request for
coverage of her expenses to attend the first meetings of the Coalition of Labor
Union Women. 7 5 At the start of Shanker's term, Stern resigned. The new
President and Executive Council did not reappoint any members to the
76
Women's Rights Committee.
C. LaFleur v. Cleveland Board of Education and Legal Feminism
In the winter of 1971, Jo Carol LaFleur found herself waging a battle to
continue teaching at a Cleveland public school. School district policy
established that "a maternity leave of absence shall be effective no later than
the end of the fourth month of pregnancy (five months before the expected date
of the normal birth of the child)." 77 The teacher handbook restricted maternity
leave to married teachers, with the implication that unmarried teachers would
be terminated with no right to return.78 Married and expecting a child, Jo Carol
LaFleur had no intention of taking leave and filed a formal grievance with her
principal "requesting that [she] be allowed to remain the entire school year."79
73. MURPHY,supra note 26, at 258-61.
74. See Letter from Barry K. Noack, Vice President, Am. Fed'n of Teachers, to John Schmid,
Assistant to the President, Am. Fed'n of Teachers (July 29, 1974) (Marjorie Stern Papers, Part I, box 2,
folder 21) (on file with the Walter Reuther Library, Wayne State University Archive of Labor & Urban
Affairs); Letter from Marjorie Stern, Chairwoman, Women's Rights Comm., Am. Fed'n of Teachers, to
Barry Noack, Vice President, Am. Fed'n of Teachers (July 23, 1974) (Marjorie Stem Papers, Part I, box
2, folder 21) (on file with the Walter Reuther Library, Wayne State University Archive of Labor &
Urban Affairs).
75. Letter from Robert G. Porter, Sec'y-Treasurer, Am. Fed'n of Teachers, to Marjorie Stem,
Chairwoman, Women's Rights Comm., Am. Fed'n of Teachers (Sept. 3, 1974) (Marjorie Stem Papers,
Part I, box 6, folder 4) (on file with the Walter Reuther Library, Wayne State University Archive of
Labor & Urban Affairs).
76. Letter from Marjorie Stern, Chairwoman, Women's Rights Comm., Am. Fed'n of Teachers, to
Leonore Hoffman (Dec. 1, 1974) (Marjorie Stem Papers, Part I, box 6, folder 6) (on file with the Walter
Reuther Library, Wayne State University Archive of Labor & Urban Affairs).
77. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. Div. of Personnel, Request for Maternity Leave of Absence, effective
Feb. 1, 1971 (Women's Law Fund, box 24, folder 11) (on file with the Western Reserve Historical
Society) (emphasis in original) (citing Administrative Code § 631).
78. CLEVELAND BD. OF EDUC., Chapter Three: Leave of Absence Without Pay (Women's Law
Fund, box 24, folder 11) (on file with the Western Reserve Historical Society).
79. Jo Carol LaFleur, Initiation of Grievance Form for Personnel Represented by the Cleveland
Teachers Union (filed Mar. 3, 1971) (Women's Law Fund, box 24, folder 11) (on file with the Western
Reserve Historical Society).
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Although the Board of Education took the maternity leave policy under
advisement, it refused to make any changes before LaFleur's scheduled leave
date of March 12, 1971.80
The roots of the LaFleur case show that pregnancy dismissal policies
derived from social values respecting pregnancy, sexuality, mothering, and
race. This social history also exemplifies the alliance that formed between
employed women-activists in their workplaces-and feminist attorneys who
themselves faced discrimination in the legal profession. Analyzing the LaFleur
case, beginning with the complaint and district court hearing, provides insight
into the content of the feminist vision for employment equality and
reproductive liberty. Feminists sought to replace conservative gender ideals
with principles based on liberal notions of individual self-determination,
progressive social policy, evolving medical standards, and sex equality in the
workplace.
1. From Civil Rights to Women's Rights: Jo Carol LaFleur's Journey
Jo Carol LaFleur grew up in a white, working-class neighborhood of
Richmond, Virginia during the 1950s and 1960s, when the highly segregated
city began to experience African-Americans' intensifying challenge to Jim
Crow. ' She graduated from John Marshall High School in Richmond in 1964,
as a member of the school's last all-white class.82 During her childhood, Jo
Carol came to a slow, startling revelation of the depth of racial oppression
surrounding her and its dehumanizing effects on her own relationships. The
summer of 1967, after her junior year at the College of William and Mary, she
served as a lifeguard at one of the new swimming pools that the City of
Richmond opened in black neighborhoods. The pools represented Richmond's
attempt to subvert legal challenges to segregation in public accommodations,
but they had some unintended consequences. Jo Carol found acceptance and
friendship at the pool that would put her on a new path. As she described
several decades later, "There are some highways that once you cross them, you
cannot retrace your steps."83
In the spring of 1968 LaFleur turned twenty-one; she graduated college in
June and, in August, married and moved with her husband to Cleveland. These
personal milestones in her life occurred against the backdrop of the
assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Robert F. Kennedy and the
80. Letter from Darian H. Smith, Assistant Superintendent, Pers., Cleveland Pub. Sch., to Eugene
Kolach, Grievance Chairman, Cleveland Teachers Union (Mar. 12, 1971) (Women's Law Fund, box 24,
folder 10) (on file with the Western Reserve Historical Society).
81. Jo Carol Nesset-Sale, From Sideline to Frontline: The Making of a Civil Rights Plaintiff-A
Retrospective by the Plaintiff in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, A Landmark Pregnancy
Discrimination Case, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 1, 5 (2006).
82. Id. at 6.
83. Id. at 8.
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violence at the Democratic Convention in Chicago. LaFleur, like other
feminists at the close of the sixties, took considerable inspiration from the civil
rights movement. Many of her Northern contemporaries joined the Freedom
Rides in the South as well as the student-led New Left movements. These
young women's participation served as a political consciousness-raising and,
when faced with the pervasive sexism among the male leaders of these
movements, an awakening to gender hierarchy. The civil rights movement
instructed a new generation of feminists, like LaFleur, in methods of protest
and encouraged them to interrogate the structures of subordination and
inequality in their own lives. 84
Before moving, LaFleur took her own, local stance for civil rights in
Richmond. She delivered a speech at her Baptist church attempting to persuade
the members to allow black children to attend Vacation Bible School. While
she did not succeed, the bitterness of the experience sparked LaFleur's
commitment to devote her career to teaching African-American children.85 That
inspiration brought LaFleur in the fall of 1970 to Patrick Henry Junior High
School on East 123rd Street in Cleveland, where the administration assigned
86her to a transition class of girls at risk of dropping out of school.
Little more than a year after arriving at Patrick Henry, LaFleur found
herself trying unsuccessfully to convince school authorities that she was wholly
capable of continuing to work. LaFleur quickly discovered that not her
condition itself but rather her pregnant appearance formed the basis for the
87school's opposition. The dignity and courage of the civil rights activists
LaFleur had encountered in the South, as well as her own dedication to her
students, inspired LaFleur to take action.
LaFleur thought the Cleveland school board's "forced maternity leave
system" was not only "grossly unfair but also illegal."89 Following the leave's
commencement, LaFleur showed up at school first thing in the morning for two
weeks. The principal registered her presence and then turned her away. 90 A
personnel letter reminded her, "[Y]ou have no status as a member of the Patrick
Henry Junior High School faculty." 91
84. For a thorough discussion of the resurgence of a mass feminist movement in the late sixties, and
of young women's participation in the civil rights and New Left movements, see SARA EVANS,
PERSONAL POLITICS: THE ROOTS OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE
NEW LEFT (1979).
85. Nesset-Sale, supra note 81, at 9.
86. Id. at 12.
87. Id. at 15.
88. Id. at 15-16.
89. Jo Carol LaFleur, Appeal of Decision of Assistant Superintendent for Pers. (Mar. 19, 1971)
(Women's Law Fund, box 24, folder 11) (on file with the Western Reserve Historical Society).
90. Nesset-Sale, supra note 81, at 18.
91. Letter from Julius Tanczos, Supervisor of Org., Secondary Sch., Cleveland Pub. Sch., to Jo
Carol LaFleur, Teacher (Mar. 19, 1971) (Women's Law Fund, box 24, folder 10) (on file with the
Western Reserve Historical Society).
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LaFleur repeatedly sought out potential sources of aid, each of which then
denied her a remedy. She requested union counsel to represent her both in
school board hearings and federal court.92 But the union did not offer her
support.93 She contacted the local chapter of the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU), only to hear that her case was not winnable. 94 LaFleur next
called the library for the Plain Dealer, Cleveland's largest newspaper, and
asked for the names and telephone numbers of two or three women's
organizations.95 After tracing a line of referrals, LaFleur reached Jane Picker,
then a volunteer advocate with the Women's Equity Action League, who
proved eager to help.96
2. Jane Picker and the Makings of a Landmark Case
Jane Picker was no stranger to sex discrimination. She graduated from Yale
Law School in 1960 as one of a handful of women in her class. After moving to
Cleveland when her husband, Sidney Picker, received a job teaching at Case
Western Reserve Law School, Jane Picker became involved with the Women's
Equity Action League (WEAL). Elizabeth Boyer, a local women's rights
leader, and other Ohio members of the National Organization for Women
(NOW) founded WEAL in Cleveland in 1968. Boyer wanted to form an
organization as an alternative to NOW that would pursue women's economic
advancement, but not abortion rights, through educational, legislative, and
judicial legal channels, rather than via public protest.98 In 1972, following a
dispute with Boyer over WEAL's litigation activities, Picker would form a
sister organization, the Women's Law Fund, to carry out a court-oriented
agenda.99
First though, Picker accepted a job in early 1970 with a leading Cleveland
firm: Squire, Sanders & Dempsey. 00 Picker served as the first female lawyer to
work at the firm in the position of attorney. Picker recalls that the firm had
hired two female lawyers previously, one whom they employed as a librarian
92. Jo Carol LaFleur, Letter of Inquiry for Personnel Represented by the Cleveland Teachers Union
(Mar. 15, 1971) (Women's Law Fund, box 24, folder 11) (on file with the Western Reserve Historical
Society).
93. Nesset-Sale, supra note 81, at 14-15.
94. Id. at 16.
95. Id.
96. Interview with Jane M. Picker, Professor Emerita, Cleveland-Marshall Coll. of Law and Sidney
Picker, Professor Emeritus of Law, Case Western Reserve Univ., in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Mar. 28, 2007) (on
file with author).
97. Id. at 1.
98. SARA M. EVANS, TIDAL WAVE: How WOMEN CHANGED AMERICA AT CENTURY'S END 25
(2003); Women's Equity Action League. Records, 1966-1979: A Finding Aid, HARVARD UNIv. LIBRARY
ONLINE ARCHIVAL SEARCH INFO. SYs., available at http://oasis.lib.harvard.eduloasis/
deliver/-sch00323.
99. Interview with Jane M. Picker & Sidney Picker, supra note 96, at 1.
100. Id.
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and another whom they relegated to work filling out tax forms. 01 Squire,
Sanders & Dempsey confined Picker to backroom research because she was a
woman. "I wanted litigation experience and they were not about to let a woman
work in litigation," she said.102 Picker saw that the firm had allowed its few
black lawyers to do pro bono work, even though it barred them from face-to-
face work with paying clients and from courtroom appearances; so, she asked
to do the same. Though the decision proved controversial, the firm ultimately
allowed her to take some pro bono clients. And then Picker received the call
from LaFleur.103
A large litigation campaign did not loom at the forefront of Picker's mind
when LaFleur contacted her. The strategy would come later. Picker recalls
today that for the moment, "We had a client; we had a problem." Yet, Picker
also anticipated the landmark character of the nascent case facing her,
predicting it would go all the way to the Supreme Court. Her gumption proved
"fortuitous," as she based all her preparation on this correct assumption. 105
Soon, a second plaintiff emerged. Ann Elizabeth Nelson taught French to
seventh, eighth, and ninth graders at Central Junior High School in Cleveland.
She did not qualify for the Board's maternity leave, however, because she had
not yet served one continuous year.' 06 When the Cleveland Board of Education
learned of Nelson's pregnancy, it discharged her outright on March 26, 1971.107
Picker faced the task of convincing a federal court that pregnant workers
no longer warranted protective treatment and instead possessed a legal right to
treatment as autonomous individuals. The 1908 Supreme Court case Muller v.
Oregon, still good law in 1970, posed the largest doctrinal hurdle. Muller
upheld a state law limiting the workday for female factory and laundry
employees to ten hours. The Court reasoned that protecting a woman's physical
health, and consequently her childbearing capacity and the health of her
offspring, constituted a public concern. In 1971, a court might similarly
reason that protecting pregnant female teachers from injury by requiring them
to take leave amounted to a legitimate state interest. Under the rational basis
test then applicable to sex classifications, the school's policy would probably
pass muster if a district court reached this conclusion. Picker remembers that
she "wrote the brief in a way so as not to lead back to Muller."
09
101. Id. at 20.
102. Id. at 1.
103. Id. at 2.
104. Id. at 4.
105. Id. at 3.
106. Affidavit of Ann Elizabeth Nelson, LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 326 F. Supp. 1208
(N.D. Ohio Apr. 7, 1971) (No. C 71-292) (Women's Law Fund, box 23, folder 16) (on file with the
Western Reserve Historical Society).
107. Id.
108. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
109. Interview with Jane M. Picker & Sidney Picker, supra note 96.
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3. The District Court Hearing in LaFleur
The record produced by the district court hearings in LaFleur provides a
window into competing legal and cultural constructions of pregnancy. The
defendant school board used the rhetoric of gender protection to justify its
pregnancy dismissal policy. The record, however, alluded to other motivations
for the maternity leave policies: concerns about the visual representation of
sexuality in the schools and traditional gender ideals regarding pregnancy and
motherhood. The plaintiffs in LaFleur and their advocates sought to convince
courts that the state's construction of employment policies on the basis of sex-
role stereotypes violated evolving constitutional and statutory standards of sex
equality. The plaintiffs sought to redefine the pregnancy dismissal policy as an
overbroad classification that violated the civil rights principle of individual
treatment. To challenge the prohibition on female teachers working past the
mid-point of their pregnancies, the plaintiffs portrayed pregnant women as
presumptively healthy. To challenge the prohibition on new mothers' return to
work, the plaintiffs depicted the policy as serving anachronistic cultural ideals.
In defending against the legal challenge to its pregnancy dismissal policy,
the Cleveland Board of Education marshaled a decades-old gendered rhetoric
of protection. The defendants called a prominent Cleveland obstetrician-
gynecologist, William Wier, to testify regarding the medical risks of
pregnancy. Wier thoroughly rehearsed the myriad medical complications that
accompany each stage of pregnancy: spontaneous abortion, nausea, vomiting,
and headaches during the first trimester; spontaneous labor, premature delivery,
and toxemia during the second; and even graver dangers of more serious
toxemia and placenta previa during the third.o10 Wier also identified
psychological effects of pregnancy, explaining that women "are worried about
the probability of a miscarriage . .. difficulties in labor and abnormalities in the
children.""' Wier suggested that working in the schools would exacerbate
these physical and psychological vulnerabilities. For example, the shoving and
pushing that presumably occurred regularly in school hallways could produce
the potentially lethal "premature separation of the placenta."ll 2 Although Wier
conceded that he had no medical evidence to back the claim, he suggested that
the hormonal changes produced by the stress of teaching might induce
premature labor." 3
Race featured explicitly in the school board's rhetoric of gender protection.
The lawyers for the school board portrayed Cleveland's schools as dangerous
places to work. The attorneys highlighted the racial and class composition of
110. Transcript of Hearing at 104-08, LaFleur, 326 F. Supp. 1208 (No. C 71-292) (Women's Law
Fund, box 23, folder 17) (on file with the Western Reserve Historical Society).
111. Id.at110.
112. Id. at 112-13.
113. Id. at 111-12.
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the student body to underscore Jo Carol LaFleur's social status as a white
female, asking her to characterize the approximately 2200 students then
attending Patrick Henry Junior High School: "And they were all from the inner
city?" "Yes," LaFleur replied. "About 100 percent black, are they not?" 1 4 The
interchange suggested that the increased racial tensions and violence in the
inner cities during the late sixties had heightened the significance of pregnancy
dismissal policies for their policies' proponents.
The record made clear, however, that the original motivation for
Cleveland's pregnancy dismissal policy had little to do with the protection of
the pregnant teacher. Instead, the policy reflected a fear of students' reactions
to the pregnant female body as an emblem of sexuality. Attempting to
demonstrate the rationality behind the proposal's enactment, the defense
deposed Mark Schinnerer, then Superintendent of the Cleveland Public
Schools, who had introduced the maternity leave provision in the early
1950s.115 Schinnerer explained that he had designed the policy to avoid
situations in which pregnant women "were subjected to humiliations,
indignities on the part of pupils, generally, who giggled about it."ll6 Schinnerer
suggested that the presence of pregnant teachers in the classroom would both
embarrass these teachers and disrupt the educational process.117 The Board of
Education chose four months as the cut-off date because "it was about a
halfway point and it was at that point when the physical appearance begins to
change."" 8
Although the Board of Education had never explicitly defended its
pregnancy dismissal policy on the basis of fears about the visual representation
of sexuality in the classroom, the plaintiffs attempted to expose the cultural
anxieties that lay beneath the surface of the Board's legal defense. The
plaintiffs contested the notion that students reacted negatively to pregnant
teachers in the classroom. Part of the irony of the case arose from the fact that
LaFleur had taught a class in which several of the students had actually been
pregnant." 9 LaFleur testified that when she told her transition class about her
pregnancy, "there was a big round of applause that went up from the girls . . .
and various delightful comments." 20 The girls did not make any snide remarks
but rather "were tickled pink and were very happy for me."'21 Students in the
study hall section LaFleur taught planned to have a shower for her, and one
114. Id. at 65.
115. Transcript of Deposition of Dr. Mark C. Schinnerer, LaFleur, 326 F. Supp. 1208 (Nos. C 71-
292, C 71-333) (Women's Law Fund, box 23, folder 15) (on file with the Western Reserve Historical
Society).
116. Id. at 11.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 16.
119. Transcript of Hearing, supra note I10, at 57.
120. Id. at 55.
121. Id.
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young mother offered to give her maternity clothes to LaFleur.122 The plaintiffs
endeavored to show that the pregnancy dismissal policy, rather than pregnancy,
disrupted the educational process.123
The notion that teaching would jeopardize the health of a pregnant woman
and her fetus did form one of Cleveland's explicit defenses. The plaintiffs
argued that this defense reflected a stereotype inconsistent with the current
medical consensus. In contrast to the defendants' construction of pregnant
women as vulnerable and in need of protection, the plaintiffs portrayed
pregnant women as presumptively healthy and able to work. The portrayal of
pregnancy as a normal, healthful condition rather than an illness constituted a
pragmatic litigation strategy and also reflected Nelson and LaFleur's personal
experiences. In a handwritten appeal to the Assistant Superintendent for
Personnel contesting her leave status, LaFleur wrote about her pregnancy, "I
feel extraordinarily well. My doctor says that I am in excellent physical
condition; yet the Administration has the gall to tell me that I am unfit for a
classroom." 24 LaFleur argued that the pregnancy dismissal policy
discriminated on the basis of overbroad stereotypes: "It seems unfair to punish
all pregnant women for the difficulties encountered by a few of them."'2 5 While
advocates had analogized pregnancy to a disability for the purpose of obtaining
disability benefits for pregnant women on leave, LaFleur used evidence of her
own health and evolving obstetrical protocols to normalize the condition of
pregnancy and to argue for the continued right to employment.
Just as Eileen Rossi had done in critiquing San Francisco's pregnancy
dismissal policy, the plaintiffs in LaFleur also used evolving medical opinion
to delegitimize Cleveland's policy. At trial, the plaintiffs called Ann Elizabeth
Nelson's obstetrician, Verners Rutenbeigs, as a witness. He had told Nelson
that "she could teach as long as she felt motivated to do so.",126 Rutenbeigs
believed women could work throughout pregnancy so long as they were in
good health and not required to engage in strenuous physical activity with risk
of injury.127 Ann Nelson's chances of having placenta previa and toxemia were
the same as any other women's chances: about one in 200 to 250 and about one
in ten respectively.128 The plaintiffs' attorneys made a case that all pregnant
women lived with risks and that employment as a teacher did not significantly
exacerbate them.
The plaintiffs attempted to reframe Cleveland's maternity leave provision
as an example of the state protective labor standards that EEOC regulations and
122. Id. at 57.
123. Id. at 25-26.
124. LaFleur, supra note 89, at 1-2.
125. Id. at 2.
126. Transcript of Hearing, supra note I10, at 82.
127. Id. at 82-83.
128. Id. at 94-95.
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a number of federal courts had invalidated. The strategy represented an attempt
to shape constitutional litigation with reference to the evolving standards of sex
discrimination under Title VII. Lawyer Carol Aginl29 questioned the Board of
Education's personnel supervisor about his testimony regarding the number of
physical assaults on teachers. Agin asked whether the supervisor had ever
considered excluding all women from teaching, or all women weighing under
150 pounds, "because of their inability to defend themselves." 130 The judge,
however, stymied this line of questioning: "Whether he has considered it or not
wouldn't make any difference to me in deciding this lawsuit."'"' Agin
strategically analogized pregnancy to other disabilities: "Do men teachers with
heart conditions get assaulted? . . . Isn't there a problem . . . that his assault
might cause another heart attack?" 32 The judge sustained an objection from
the defendants' attorney.133
Last, plaintiffs challenged the stereotype that new mothers belonged in the
home. The policy that Cleveland Superintendant Schinnerer established had
included a prohibition on women's return to work for six months following
childbirth. The school board had since modified the policy to allow women to
return at the three-month mark. Schinnerer testified in deposition, "I am a
strong believer that young children ought to have the mother there.. . . [I]t is
very important that they be there for the love and tender care of the babies." 3 4
The defendant school board's trial memorandum had made no mention of the
three-month ban on return to employment. A quotation placed at the end of the
memorandum suggested that the Board, like Schinnerer, continued to believe
that Cleveland's policy had more to do with mothers' childrearing duties than it
did the question of new mothers' capacity to work. The Board's memorandum
concluded with a biblical quote: "One is reminded of the words of the Prophet
Isaiah: 'Can a woman forget her sucking child, that she should not have
compassion on the son of her womb.'" 35
The district court denied LaFleur and Nelson's request for a temporary
injunction. The presiding judge, James C. Connell, appointed to the bench by
President Eisenhower in 1954, saw little merit in her claims. Connell began by
discussing the protective motivation behind the school board's maternity leave
policy, citing evidence presented by the defendant respecting pregnant
women's physical and psychological vulnerability. Under a standard of rational
129. Because Squire Sanders had the Cleveland Board of Education on retainer as a client, Jane
Picker could not argue LaFleur in court. Instead, lawyer Carol Agin argued the case. Interview with
Jane M. Picker & Sidney Picker, supra note 96, at 3.
130. Transcript of Hearing, supra note I10, at 227.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 228.
133. Id.
134. Transcript of Deposition of Dr. Mark C. Schinnerer, supra note 115, at 26-27.
135. Trial Memorandum of Defendants at 12, LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 326 F. Supp.
1208 (N.D. Ohio 1971) (No. C 71-292) (Women's Law Fund, box 23, folder 16) (on file with the
Western Reserve Historical Society) (citing Isaiah 49:15 (King James)).
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basis review, Judge Connell found that state governments had broad discretion
in exercising the police power for the common good and that the policy at issue
reflected a reasonable use of this power. Finally, Picker's fears about Muller v.
Oregon came true. The district court opinion in LaFleur cited Muller for the
proposition that limitations placed upon women's employment did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause, quoting the 1908 Supreme Court opinion
regarding differences in women's physical anatomy and social roles. 36
Five days later, Judge Robert R. Merhige, presiding in the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, came to opposite conclusions in a
nearly identical case: Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board.137 Bob
Merhige began his law career in the same segregated Richmond in which Jo
Carol LaFleur grew up, and like LaFleur, had gradually come to recognize the
depth of racial injustice around him. Although Merhige did not advocate on
behalf of civil rights as a lawyer in the private sector, once appointed to the
bench by President Johnson in 1967, he quickly became embroiled in the battle
over civil rights. Merhige presided over more than forty school desegregation
cases. He interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in Green v. County
School Board39 as a clear statement that Brown now stood for an affirmative
integration mandate.140 Merhige also had demonstrated a commitment to sex
equality prior to deciding Cohen. In 1969, Merhige had written an opinion for a
three-judge district court, holding that the exclusion of women from the
undergraduate college at the University of Virginia violated women's rights to
equal protection.141
In his Cohen opinion, Merhige stated that no medical evidence justified the
school board's regulation requiring female teachers to take maternity leave at
the end of five months of pregnancy. The judge wrote that pregnant women
should be treated as individuals: "[S]ince no two pregnancies are alike,
decisions of when a pregnant teacher should discontinue working are matters
best left up to the woman and her doctor. Merhige held that the maternity
136. LaFleur, 326 F. Supp. 1208.
137. 326F.Supp. 1159, 1160 (E.D. Va. 1971).
138. Robert R. Merhige, Jr., A Judge Remembers Richmond in the Post-Brown Years, 49 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 23, 25-26 (1992).
139. 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (striking down freedom-of-choice plans as an ineffective mechanism to
achieve desegregation that unjustly placed the burden of integration on black children and parents).
140. In 1972, Merhige ordered the City of Richmond and its suburbs to enter into a joint
desegregation plan that involved busing of school children across district lines. Bradley v. Sch. Bd., 338
F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1972), rev'd 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), affd 412 U.S. 92 (1973). Merhige's
opinion in Bradley earned him admiration among some communities, infamy among others, and
harassment and threats by the Ku Klux Klan, one year after Cohen.
141. Kirstein v. Univ. of Va., 309 F. Supp. 184, 187 (E.D. Va. 1970). For further discussion of
Bob Merhige in relation to civil rights and sex equality law of the late 1960s and early 1970s, see
Merhige, supra note 138; and Mark V. Tushnet, The Supreme Court and Race Discrimination, 1967-
1991: The View from the Marshall Papers, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 473, 505 (1995). See also Serena
Mayeri, The Strange Career of Jane Crow: Sex Segregation and the Transformation of Anti-
Discrimination Discourse, 18 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 187, 227 (2006).
142. Cohen, 326 F. Supp. at 1160.
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policy discriminated against women because it treated pregnancy differently
than other medical disabilities.143 Three years into the future, the Supreme
Court would consolidate these two cases, Cohen and LaFleur, on petition for a
writ of certiorari and would confront the competing legal positions they
represented: one holding mandatory maternity leaves constitutional and the
other finding them unconstitutional.
II. PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION CASES IN THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS:
FROM THE CIVIL RIGHTS MODEL TO SEX EQUALITY TO SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS
Over the course of litigation efforts during the early 1970s, legal feminists
argued that pregnancy dismissal policies violated their rights to equality and to
liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment. Legal feminists attempted to translate
their vision of justice, which labor feminists had pursued in organizing
campaigns, into doctrinal claims that the courts might recognize. Feminist
attorneys argued that pregnancy dismissal policies violated both the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses. The separation of equality and liberty as a
matter of constitutional structure and judicial doctrine, however, made it
difficult for legal feminists to articulate the relationship between these interests
in legal claims. Part II discusses the doctrinal and institutional obstacles legal
feminists faced as they undertook the vexing process of translating
socioeconomic claims into legal ones. This Part analyzes legal feminists'
successes and disappointments in persuading courts that women possessed
interrelated rights to equal employment opportunity and reproductive liberty.
This Part first examines legal feminists' effort to convince the lower
federal courts that pregnancy dismissal policies violated women's rights under
the Equal Protection Clause. In cases challenging these policies, plaintiffs and
their attorneys made two broad argumentative moves: They argued, to begin,
that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy constituted sex discrimination
and, furthermore, that sex, like race, should trigger a strict scrutiny standard of
review. In making these arguments, legal feminists faced two corresponding
obstacles. Courts initially applied a formalist conception of sex equality that
failed to recognize how the legal regulation of pregnancy on the basis of sex-
role stereotypes contributed to women's inequality. Even when courts began to
recognize the relationship between pregnancy-based and sex discrimination,
however, they resisted plaintiffs' arguments for strict scrutiny on the ground
that 'real' biological differences necessitated the ongoing salience of sex
differentiation under the law.
143. Id.at1161.
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Second, this Part examines legal feminists' efforts to convince the lower
federal courts that pregnancy dismissal policies violated women's rights under
the Due Process Clause. In addition to challenging these policies as a violation
of sex equality, legal feminists challenged the policies as an infringement of
women's reproductive privacy rights. Most notably, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, then
counsel for the ACLU Women's Rights Project, began as early as 1971 to
experiment with the argument that by forcing women to choose between
motherhood and work, the dismissal policies infringed on women's right to
bear children. In 1973, the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade opened
the door wider to substantive due process arguments against pregnancy
dismissal policies. Feminist attorneys began to argue that just as women had a
right to abortion, so too did they have a fundamental right to bear children.
Pregnancy discrimination, they argued, burdened this right.
The holding, which at least one federal court had reached by 1973, that
pregnancy dismissal policies infringed women's reproductive rights under the
Due Process Clause, held implications for women's right to sex equality as well
as reproductive liberty. The family-wage system took as one premise that
bread-winning men would pay for the costs associated with pregnancy and
childbirth, including medical expenses and women's lost income during periods
of physical incapacity and early infant caregiving. The holding that the denial
of equal employment opportunity to childbearing women infringed upon their
reproductive liberty entailed a sea change in the view of the family. Such a
holding suggested that women should be treated as independent individuals
competing in the public sphere rather than socioeconomic dependents within
the family.
A. The Liberalization ofMaternity Leave Policies Under the Equal Protection
Clause
Legal feminists successfully leveraged evolving antidiscrimination
principles to challenge pregnancy dismissal policies under the Equal Protection
Clause. Yet, they also faced significant resistance to their doctrinal goals from
judges who subscribed to a formalist conception of sex equality and who
believed in the extant legal relevance of biological sex difference. When
plaintiffs first began to bring lawsuits challenging the pregnancy dismissal
policies in 1971, they drew on the civil rights model to convince courts that the
policies constituted arbitrary classifications, unconstitutional under rational
basis review. Courts, however, rejected plaintiffs' argument that that the
dismissal policies discriminated on the basis of sex. By 1972, courts began to
internalize plaintiffs' arguments that the dismissal policies reflected sex-role
stereotypes inherent to gender inequality. Courts nonetheless refused to accept
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plaintiffs' arguments that they should make sex a suspect class under the Equal
Protection Clause.
1. Rational Basis Scrutiny and Sex-Role Stereotypes
Evolving principles of antidiscrimination law led courts to hold pregnancy
dismissal policies unconstitutional. These principles included the need to justify
state action on the basis of rational and empirically based social policy as well
as the eschewal of overbroad stereotypes. In response to the first wave of
plaintiffs' suits in 1971 and 1972, courts began to hold that the policies lacked
justification in current medical standards and unfairly classified women as a
group on the basis of anachronistic stereotypes concerning pregnancy and
gender roles. 1" Despite ruling in plaintiffs' favor, these opinions employed a
formalist interpretation of the classifications at issue to reject plaintiffs'
argument that the policies amounted to unconstitutional sex discrimination.
Judges' insistence on evidence-backed and consistently applied social
policy reflected the influence of a particular model of civil rights. This model
construed discrimination as the legal imposition of overbroad social stereotypes
that harmed individuals within the stereotyped group. 14 Judges paid homage to
this principle when they concluded that mandatory leave policies lacked
evidence supporting their rationality. For example, one district court judge
found that the board's policy of allowing pregnant students and substitute
teachers contradicted its alleged rationales for the pregnancy dismissal
policies. 146 School boards often justified the policies on the ground that they
purportedly served continuity in children's education. When courts interrogated
this rationale, they found that the policies actually harmed children's
educational continuity. 147
Plaintiffs used evidence of evolving medical standards to reveal the
policies as rooted in outdated stereotypes. Courts found such evidence
persuasive. For example, the Northern District of Illinois found that no valid
medical opinion backed a school board's claim that its dismissal policy
144. But see, e.g., Schattman v. Tex. Emp't Comm'n, 459 F.2d 32, 39 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that
the state employer did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the defendant "did not terminate
her employment because she was a woman or because she became pregnant but only because her
pregnancy was far advanced"); Struck v. Sec'y of Def., 460 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir. 1971) (upholding U.S.
Air Force pregnancy discharge policy); Miller v. Indus. Comm'n, 480 P.2d 565, 568 (Colo. 1971)
(upholding denial of full unemployment compensation award to women who took maternity leave on
ground that "special consideration of pregnancy cannot be said to be unreasonable and therefore
unconstitutional").
145. The definition of civil rights did not represent a static or predetermined concept, but itself had
a dynamic history rife with ideological and political contest. For a discussion of the conflict over the
meaning of civil rights in the 1940s and 1950s, tracing a shift from claims rooted in economic
exploitation to claims focused on formal equality and the psychological harm wrought by racial
stereotypes, see RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2007).
146. Bravo v. Bd. of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 155, 158 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
147. See, e.g., id.
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protected pregnant teachers.148 The Northern District of Ohio noted that
medical evidence presented at trial revealed the irrationality of a leave
requirement at the end of the fourth month of pregnancy.149 In reality, the first
and not the second trimester posed the most danger to the expectant mother.' 50
Likewise, a Northern District of California opinion quoted at length from
written statements and affidavits by obstetricians attesting to the physical and
psychological benefits of work to pregnant women as well as to individual
variation in pregnant women's capacity to work.151
Courts also interpreted the Supreme Court's 1971 decision in Reed v. Reed,
the first to strike down a law as a violation of sex discrimination, as further
heightening the prohibition of government regulation of persons on the basis of
overbroad stereotypes, rather than the liberal principle of individual treatment.
In Reed, the Court employed a rational basis standard of review to invalidate an
Idaho law expressing a preference for male over female estate administrators as
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 152 Commentators at the time saw the
decision as employing an intermediate standard of review, greater than rational
basis scrutiny but less than strict scrutiny. 153 The Southern District of Ohio
applied Reed to a pregnancy dismissal case, interpreting the Supreme Court's
decision to prohibit the perpetuation of "old sexual stereotypes, in the guise of
benign protective statutes."1 54 Instead, the district court endorsed a new
paradigm of individual treatment: "Any rule by an employer that seeks to deal
with all pregnant employees in an identical fashion is dehumanizing to the
individual women involved and is by its very nature arbitrary and
discriminatory." 55
Even when lower federal courts applied Reed as precedent, however, they
proved reluctant to view the pregnancy dismissal policies within a sex equality
framework. Indeed, despite the undercurrents of sex equality in their opinions,
judges balked at plaintiffs' proposition that the challenged pregnancy dismissal
policies constituted sex discrimination. For example, one judge reasoned that a
challenged policy drew distinctions "between teachers who are required to stop
working during their sixth and subsequent months of pregnancy . . . and all
other teachers[,] . . . and between teachers on maternity leave and those
[teachers] . . . on other types of leaves. These obviously do not involve criteria
that can be characterized as suspect."' 56 Courts' logic evinced a formalist
148. Id.
149. Heath v. Westerville Bd. of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 501, 505 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
150. Id.
151. Williams v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438,440-42 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
152. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
153. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search ofEvolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86. HARV. L. REV. 1, 30 (1972).
154. Heath, 345 F. Supp. at 506.
155. Id. at 505.
156. Bravo v. Bd. of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 155, 157 (N.D. Ill. 1972); see also Heath, 345 F. Supp. at
507 (holding the pregnancy dismissal policy irrational but not finding sex discrimination).
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interpretation of sex equality, which distinguished between classifications on
the basis of pregnancy and classifications on the basis of sex. Formalist
reasoning blinded judges from seeing that pregnancy dismissal policies relied
upon stereotypes regarding female sexuality, pregnant women's capacity for
work, and the family-wage system.
In addition to formalism, a persistent belief in the importance of biological
difference to the law caused judges to reject the sex discrimination paradigm. A
district court that found the challenged regulations unconstitutional
nevertheless reasoned: "Despite the rising crescendo of controversy about
Women's Liberation which has been raging in the popular press recently, this
Court is willing to conclude that there are certain ineluctable differences
between men and women." 57 Pregnancy dismissal policies might be irrational,
but their legal invalidation could not herald the erosion of sex differentiation
under the law.
2. A Cautious Embrace of the Sex Discrimination Paradigm
By the spring of 1972, the courts had moved beyond early determinations
that pregnancy dismissal policies constituted irrational state action in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause, to hold that these policies violated women's
right to sex equality. Courts' new willingness to analyze the policies within a
sex equality framework reflected the rising influence of the second-wave
feminist movement and of nascent constitutional and statutory sex equality
jurisprudence. These cases did more than prohibit overbroad, arbitrary
classifications that denied individual treatment. The cases explicitly
characterized legal regulation of pregnancy on the basis of sex-role stereotypes
as sex discrimination.
The courts explicitly acknowledged the relationship between evolving
social standards, feminist political activism, and their holdings in the pregnancy
discrimination cases. In April 1972, Judge Constance Baker Motley in the
Southern District of New York denied New York City's motion for summary
judgment in a class action suit claiming that pregnancy dismissal policies
violated equal protection.'58 Motley-formerly a leading NAACP attorney and
New York State Senator-wrote: "It is true, as plaintiffs claim, that equal rights
for women is an idea whose time has come. As a result, the courts have begun
to re-examine all sex based restrictions and to apply with increasing sensitivity
the guarantee of equal protection of the laws to prohibit arbitrary sex
157. Heath, 345 F. Supp. at 505.
158. Memorandum Opinion and Order on Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment at 5,
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 394 F. Supp. 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd 532 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1976),
rev'd 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (71 Civ. 3324) (Catherine East Papers, box 10, folder 17) (on file with the
Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).
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discrimination." 59 The Second Circuit spoke with even greater candor: "One
realizes with a shock what so many women now proclaim: Old accepted rules
and customs often discriminate against women in ways that have long been
taken for granted or have gone unnoticed."'1
60
Judges, however, drew lines in the sand. Though willing to connect
pregnancy discrimination to sex inequality, judges did not follow plaintiffs'
suggestion that they treat sex as a suspect class and apply heightened scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause. From the perspective of legal formalism,
making sex a suspect class in a case concerming pregnancy-the exemplar of
sex difference-appeared paradoxical. From the plaintiffs' perspective,
however, the pregnancy dismissal cases illustrated precisely the need for strict
scrutiny for sex-based classifications. The legal regulation of pregnancy on the
basis of sex-role stereotypes formed the crux of gender hierarchy. Strict
scrutiny for sex would shed a harsher light on the legal regulation of gender,
including pregnancy-related regulation, which might otherwise appear to the
courts as rational, familiar, and intuitively logical.
Part of the lower courts' reluctance derived from the fact that the Supreme
Court, at the time, did not provide clear guidance. In the case of Frontiero v.
Richardson,6 2 decided in May 1973, Justice Brennan authored a plurality
opinion arguing that sex was "inherently suspect" and, like race, merited strict
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.163 Brennan, however, proved
unable to muster a majority in support of his position. Justice Stewart
concurred in the plurality's judgment. Justice Powell wrote a separate
concurrence arguing that the pendency of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA),
which had passed Congress and now awaited ratification by the states, should
prevent the Court from prematurely resolving the standards applicable to sex.165
In deciding the pregnancy discrimination cases, the lower courts interpreted
Frontiero as a sign that the equal protection standards applicable to sex
remained ambiguous; most avoided weighing in on the controversy and decided
the cases under rational basis scrutiny.166
159. Id.
160. Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629, 634 (2d Cir. 1973).
161. Id. at 632-33; Hutchison v. Lake Oswego Sch. Dist., 374 F. Supp. 1056, 1061 (D. Or. 1974);
Aiello v. Hansen, 359 F. Supp. 792, 797 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
162. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
163. Id. at 682.
164. For further discussion, see Serena Mayeri, "When the Trouble Started": The Story of
Frontiero v. Richardson, in WOMEN AND THE LAW STORIES (Elizabeth M. Schneider & Stephanie M.
Wildman eds., 2010).
165. 411 U.S. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring).
166. See Crawford v. Cushman, 378 F. Supp. 717, 723-24 (D. Vt. 1974); Scott v. Opelika City
Sch., 63 F.R.D. 144, 147 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Hutchison, 374 F. Supp. at 1061; Aiello, 359 F. Supp. at 796
(interpreting Reed to have "mark[ed] a general shift in the 'rational basis' test to a standard 'slightly, but
perceptibly, more rigorous,"' but declining to apply strict scrutiny) (internal citation omitted). But see
Farkas v. Sw. City Sch. Dist., 1974 WL 225, *1 (S.D. Ohio, Apr. 8, 1974) (interpreting Frontiero to
have afforded heightened scrutiny to sex).
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In the spring of 1972, however, when LaFleur appealed her case to the
Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court had not yet handed down Frontiero. Both
parties in LaFleur contested the level of scrutiny that the Sixth Circuit should
apply to sex-based classifications. The teachers, as plaintiff-appellants, relied
on a California Supreme Court case and a Harvard Law Review Note to make
the argument that sex, like race, should be considered a "suspect classification"
under the Equal Protection Clause. 67 The defendant-appellees responded that
the Supreme Court had never held sex to be a suspect classification. The school
board argued that the Sixth Circuit should act with caution because the Equal
Rights Amendment had passed Congress and was pending ratification by the
states. Adoption of the strict scrutiny standard, the board warned, would
"gratuitously expose[] the multitude of existing sex-related laws to judicial
'amendment,' without consideration of whether judicial, legislative, or
constitutional reform, or a combination, is the best procedure for upgrading
women's rights."168 The board implied that the expansion of sex equality rights
under the Equal Protection Clause would lack democratic legitimacy.169
In stark contrast to the Cleveland school board, which argued that evolving
sex discrimination doctrine under Title VII should not inform the Sixth
Circuit's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, the plaintiffs drew on
precedent under Title VII to make their constitutional argument. This strategy
represented an effort to infuse constitutional argument with popular
understandings of sex equality. Since the mid-1960s, feminists had used
democratic channels to articulate their vision of sex equality. 70 They had
campaigned for the inclusion of a sex provision within Title VII, pressured the
EEOC to enforce this sex provision, and advocated for the temporary disability
paradigm. Now, feminist advocates sought to use their successes in the
legislative and administrative spheres to shape the development of equal
protection doctrine. In the early 1970s, courts had not yet sharply distinguished
between constitutional and statutory standards.' 7' The plaintiff-appellants in
LaFleur had ample doctrinal space in which to maneuver.
167. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 16-17, LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184
(6th Cir. 1972) (No. 71-1598), af'd414 U.S. 632 (1974) (Women's Law Fund, box 24, folder 1) (on file
with the Western Reserve Historical Society) (citing Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529 (Cal. 1971);
Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1125-27 (1969)).
168. Brief for Appellees at 31, LaFleur, 465 F.2d 1184 (No. 71-1598) (Women's Law Fund, box
24, folder 2) (on file with the Western Reserve Historical Society).
169. This type of argument prefigured Justice Powell's concurrence in Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 691 (1973).
170. For a discussion of how feminists expressed popular constitutional understandings of sex
equality via democratic legislative channels, see Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative
Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave
Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003). For further discussion of the quasi-constitutional nature of feminist
legislative and administrative advocacy regarding pregnancy, see Schwartz, supra note 49.
171. In the mid-1970s, courts began to more rigidly delineate between constitutional and statutory
standards of equality. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (holding that the
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The effort to tie constitutional standards of sex equality to statutory ones
was at once strategic and political. When Jane Picker first began to prepare the
LaFleur case for briefing and argument before the district court, the federal
courts' nascent sex equality jurisprudence did little to support her challenge to
the school district's mandatory maternity leave policy. 172 Picker and Agin
turned to another source of law that might potentially illuminate the meaning of
constitutional sex equality: the nascent body of court opinions and
administrative regulations under the sex equality provision of Title VII. They
drew upon Title VII even though the statute at that time did not cover state
governments and educational institutions. Picker and Agin had argued before
the district court that a Title VII case striking down a mandatory maternity
leave policy buttressed their constitutional challenge to the Cleveland Board of
Education policy. 173 The strategy did not prove successful at the district court
level, however. In ruling for the defendants, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio held that because Title VII did not form the basis of
jurisdiction in LaFleur, the Title VII case did not offer the plaintiffs any
support. 174
Just as Picker and Agin felt that Title VII and EEOC authority held
relevance for their case, so too did EEOC staffers feel that they had a stake in
the case's outcome. The fluidity between statutory and constitutional standards
of sex equality reflected the personal and ideological connections between
feminist attorneys pursuing litigation and the few feminist staffers at the
EEOC.175 Susan Deller Ross, the EEOC staffer most instrumental in devising
the 1972 EEOC guidelines on pregnancy discrimination, asked the Sixth
Circuit's permission to participate in oral argument and to file a reply brief on
disparate impact theory of discrimination, cognizable under Title VII, is not similarly available under the
Equal Protection Clause).
172. A district court in Colorado had issued a preliminary injunction in the case of Robinson v.
Rand staying enforcement of the Air Force regulation providing for the automatic discharge of pregnant
women, but the case had limited precedential value as the court had not yet reached the merits. Brief on
Behalf of the Plaintiff, LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. at 8, 326 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1971)
(Nos. C 71-292, C 71-333), rev'd 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972), af'd 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (citing
Robinson v. Rand, No. C-2746, 1971 WL 115 (D. Colo. Jan.13, 1971)) (Women's Law Fund, box 23,
folder 16) (on file with the Western Reserve Historical Society). A handful of other decisions struck
down state laws that categorically excluded women from jury service and denied them the right to sue
for loss of consortium. But because these cases involved classifications on the basis of sex explicitly,
they did not directly support the argument that pregnancy discrimination constituted sex discrimination.
See id. at 12.
173. Id. at 11-12 (citing Schattman v. Tex. Emp't Comm'n, 330 F. Supp. 328 (W.D. Tex. 1971)
(holding that the termination of female employees at seven months of pregnancy was a violation of Title
VII), rev'd 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972)). The Fifth Circuit later reversed the district court opinion in the
Title VII case cited by Picker and Agin. Schattman v. Tex. Emp't Comm'n, 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972).
174. LaFleur, 326 F. Supp. at 1212-13.
175. See Memorandum from Sonia Pressman Fuentes, Att'y, Office of Gen. Counsel, EEOC, to
Jane Picker (Mar. 30, 1972) (Women's Law Fund, box 23, folder 12) (on file with the Western Reserve
Historical Society).
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behalf of amicus curiae. 176 The EEOC brief argued that under Reed, the school
board must support its policy with evidence rather than stereotypes and that
administrative convenience could not serve as a justification for sex
discrimination.17 7 After oral argument, but before the Sixth Circuit had decided
the case, Congress amended Title VII to reach educational institutions and
governments. The next month, the EEOC issued its sex discrimination
guidelines adopting the temporary disability paradigm. 79 Ross wrote to the
clerk for the Sixth Circuit calling attention to the new legislation and
suggesting that the guidelines, though not directly applicable, nonetheless
offered an "appropriate standard to use in deciding this case.,,1s Ross felt that
the EEOC, as the agency responsible for enforcing the sex equality mandate
under Title VII, could influence the court's understanding of constitutional sex
equality. Ross must also have feared that the ratchet could go both ways. An
adverse decision under the Equal Protection Clause might have negative
consequences for the robust enforcement of the sex provision under Title VII.
The Sixth Circuit's July 1972 decision in LaFleur held that Cleveland's
pregnancy dismissal policy violated the Equal Protection Clause.181 The
decision reflected the influence of evolving sex equality standards under Title
VII. The majority opinion took note of Congress's amendments to Title VII and
the EEOC guidelines regarding pregnancy discrimination. 18 2 The court did not
explain, however, exactly what significance statutory antidiscrimination law
held for standards of constitutional interpretation. Clues throughout the opinion
suggest that the court found Title VII standards relevant to constitutional sex
equality. The court distinguished an unfavorable Fifth Circuit decision under
Title VII not by differentiating between statutory and constitutional standards
of sex equality, but rather by reasoning that the regulation at issue in the Fifth
Circuit case had less drastic consequences for female workers.183 Furthermore,
the temporary disability model enshrined in the EEOC guidelines shaped how
176. See Letter from James A. Higgins, Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, to Susan
Deller Ross, Att'y, Office of Gen. Counsel, EEOC (Jan. 31, 1972); Letter from James A. Higgins, Clerk,
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, to Susan Deller Ross, Att'y, Office of Gen. Counsel, EEOC
(Dec. 7, 1971) (Women's Law Fund, box 23, folder 12) (on file with the Western Reserve Historical
Society).
177. Reply Brief for the U.S. EEOC as Amicus Curiae at 2, LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465
F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972) (No. 71-1598), affd 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (Women's Law Fund, box 24,
folder 3) (on file with the Western Reserve Historical Society).
178. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 6 Stat. 103 (1972).
179. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 37 Fed. Reg. 6819, 6837 (Apr. 5, 1972)
(codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10).
180. Letter from Susan Deller Ross, Att'y, Office of Gen. Counsel, EEOC, to James A. Higgins,
Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, (Apr. 11, 1972) (Women's Law Fund, box 23, folder
12) (on file with the Western Reserve Historical Society).
181. LaFleur, 465 F.2d at 1185, 1188-89.
182. Id.at1186.
183. The regulation at issue in the Title VII case imposed mandatory maternity leave at the seventh
month rather than the fourth or fifth month of pregnancy. Id. (citing Schattman v. Tex. Emp't Comm'n,
459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972)).
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the court understood the pregnancy dismissal policy. The court explained that
the differential treatment of pregnancy, though a condition unique to women,
constituted sex-based discrimination: "Male teachers are not subject to
pregnancy, but they are subject to many types of illnesses and disabilities."' "
While the Sixth Circuit concluded that sex-role stereotypes, rather than
inherent biological difference, lay at the heart of the pregnancy dismissal
policies, the Fourth Circuit came to the opposite conclusion in Cohen v.
Chesterfield County School Board.'85 The majority opinion for an en banc court
reversed Judge Merhige's opinion for the Eastern District of Virginia and ruled
for the defendant school board. The opinion's language slipped between
formalist and normative conclusions. The court suggested that equal protection
only prohibited classification between males and females to the extent that the
sexes were similarly situated. Accordingly, the decision held that classifications
on the basis of pregnancy could not constitute sex discrimination because
pregnancy was a condition unique to females. 87 The court cited for support
other laws regulating single-sex characteristics: the criminalization of rape by
males, military regulations requiring men to shave their beards, and regulations
prohibiting women from revealing their breasts in public.
The Fourth Circuit, however, described reproductive sex difference in
romantic terms that alluded not only to pregnancy but also to gender roles. The
opinion further explained that the laws of society could not overcome those of
nature: "No man-made law or regulation excludes males from those
experiences, and no such laws or regulations can relieve females from all of the
burdens which naturally accompany the joys and blessings of motherhood."l 89
Having rejected the link between pregnancy-based and sex-based
discrimination, and having found no other reason to apply a strict scrutiny
standard of review, the court applied rational basis review to uphold the
defendant's pregnancy dismissal policy. 190
Once again, Cohen and LaFleur formed a dyad, though in the circuit courts
of appeals the cases reversed positions: LaFleur came out in favor of the
teachers and Cohen for the school board. In less than two years, the Supreme
Court would resolve the conflict between the holdings. But in the meantime
plaintiffs continued to litigate.
184. Id. at 1188.
185. 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1973) (en banc).
186. Id. at 399.
187. Id. at 397 ("The fact that only women experience pregnancy and motherhood removes all
possibility of competition between the sexes in this area.").
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Under the rational basis standard, the Fourth Circuit held that the defendant school board
needed only to show that the pregnancy dismissal policy reasonably related to the state's legitimate
interest in promoting educational continuity. Id. at 398-99.
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B. Struck v. Secretary of Defense and Legal Feminist Experimentation with
Fundamental Rights Arguments Against Pregnancy Dismissal Policies
In November 1971, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
constitutionality of an Air Force regulation that called for the automatic
discharge of officers upon a determination that they were pregnant or had given
birth to a live child.19 Susan Struck, an Air Force nurse dismissed from her
post in Vietnam because she was pregnant, had challenged the regulation. The
Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court ruling for the government,192 holding that
the statute rationally took account of the physical difference between an
expectant mother and father. Had there been an attack, the court reasoned,
Struck might have had a miscarriage and become "a patient instead of a
nurse." 93
When the Supreme Court granted Captain Struck's petition for a writ of
certiorari in October 1972, Ruth Bader Ginsburg saw an opportunity to realize
the larger aim of achieving strict scrutiny for sex-based classifications. 194
Ginsburg did not oppose sex-based classifications as a matter of formal
equality, but rather argued that the Air Force's pregnancy discharge policy
violated women's constitutional right to sex equality by imposing sex-role
stereotypes. 19 Ginsburg's brief before the Supreme Court noted that although
the Air Force took multiple affirmative steps to accommodate fathers in
service, it presumed Susan Struck "unfit for service under a regulation that
declares, without regard to fact, that she fits 'into the stereotyped vision ... of
the 'correct' female response to pregnancy."' 9 6 The regulation imposed
traditional sex roles on pregnant women by "reinforce[ing] societal pressure to
relinquish career aspirations for a hearth centered existence." 97 The Air
Force's pregnancy discharge policy excluded childbearing women from
participation in the military, the quintessential locus of male citizenship. The
policy made visible how the legal regulation of pregnancy shaped women's
unequal citizenship status.
191. Struck v. Sec'y ofDef., 460 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir. 1971), vacated, 409 U.S. 1071 (1972).
192. Id. at 1374, 1377.
193. Id. at 1375.
194. See Letter from Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gen. Counsel, Am. Civil Liberties Union, to Joseph J.
Levin, Jr. (Dec. 20, 1972) (Ruth Bader Ginsburg Papers, box 3, folder: Frontiero v. Richardson 1972)
(on file with the Library of Congress).
195. For further discussion of the antisubordination arguments Ginsburg made in her brief on
Struck to the Supreme Court, see Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex
Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REv. 83, 91-105, 126-27 (2010); and Neil S. Siegel & Reva B.
Siegel, Struck by Stereotype: Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Pregnancy Discrimination as Sex Discrimination,
59 DuKE L.J. 771 (2010).
196. Brief for the Petitioner at 50-51, Struck v. Sec'y of Def., 409 U.S. 947 (1972) (No. 72-178),
1972 WL 135840 (quoting Heath v. Westerville Bd. of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 501, 505, 506 n.l (S.D. Ohio
1972)).
197. Id. at 60.
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The Supreme Court, however, never decided Struck on the merits and thus
avoided deciding how the legal regulation of pregnancy might affect women's
rights under the Equal Protection Clause. In December 1972, after having
vigorously opposed Struck's recourse to the courts, the Air Force decided to
extend her the "charity of a military commander" and waive the discharge
regulations in her case.19 Ginsburg contended that the case was not moot
because Struck had not yet received all the relief entitled her and because the
Air Force continued to enforce the discharge policy with respect to other
service members pursuing cases in the federal courts.' 99 The Court nevertheless
vacated the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case for
200consideration of the mootness issue. Frustrated in her efforts with Struck,
Ginsburg pinned her hopes for achieving strict scrutiny on another case:
Frontiero v. Richardson.201
In Struck, Ginsburg had not only pursued strict scrutiny but had
experimented, too, with fundamental rights arguments challenging the Air
Force regulations, which forced a pregnant officer either to abort or to accept
202discharge. Ginsburg argued, before the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court,
that the regulation violated Susan Struck's right to reproductive privacy as well
203Wihhr
as her First Amendment right to free religious expression. With hardly any
discussion, the Ninth Circuit dismissed this line of argument, finding that the
"necessity for, or at least the high degree of rationality of [the regulation]
shows plainly through the fabric of this case." 204 Ginsburg's arguments reveal
205
that she viewed sex equality and reproductive liberty as intertwined rights. In
subsequent cases, feminist attorneys would similarly argue that these policies
infringed upon women's reproductive liberty as well as their equal employment
opportunity.
The fundamental rights argument held both strategic strengths and
weaknesses. The argument had the potential to circumvent the major doctrinal
obstacle to the equal protection argument: courts' formalist interpretation that
sex equality did not reach sex-unique characteristics. An evaluation of whether
a maternity policy infringed upon a fundamental right did not involve a
comparison between women and men. Defendants, however, could also invoke
the rights/privilege distinction to defeat the kind of privacy argument Ginsburg
198. Opposition to Memorandum for the Respondents Suggesting Mootness at 2, Struck, 409 U.S.
1071 (No. 72-178), 1972 WL 135842.
199. Id.at2-4.
200. Struck, 409 U.S. 1071.
201. Letter from Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Joseph J. Levin, Jr., Legal Dir., S. Poverty Law Ctr. (Dec.
20, 1972) (Ruth Bader Ginsburg Papers, box 3, folder: Frontiero v. Richardson 1972) (on file with the
Library of Congress). The case to which Ginsburg turned her attention, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973), resulted in a plurality opinion applying strict scrutiny to sex-based classifications.
202. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 196, at 12.
203. Id.at52-58.
204. Struck, 460 F.2d at 1376.
205. Siegel & Siegel, supra note 195, at 791, 796.
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set forth in Struck. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously articulated the
rights/privilege distinction in the 1892 case of McAulffe v. Mayor of New
Bedford, which upheld the firing of a policeman under a regulation that
restricted his political activities.206 Holmes held that McAuliffe had a
"constitutional right to talk politics, but . . . no constitutional right to be a
policeman." 20 7 Defendants could apply the same logic to pregnancy dismissal
policies. If one expanded upon the substantive due process line of cases relating
to familial privacy from Meyer v. Nebraska208 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters209
through Griswold v. Connecticut,2o women might have a fundamental right to
bear children. But, a defendant could argue, women did not have the right to
work while exercising the right to bear children. In a second case challenging
the Air Force discharge policy, Gutierrez v. Laird, the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia resorted to the rights/privilege distinction.211 The court
held that the policy did not infringe upon women's right to bear children but
merely denied them the privilege of serving in the Air Force while exercising
that right.212
C. Roe v. Wade and the Opening ofSubstantive Due Process Claims
In 1973, the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade enacted a revolution
in substantive due process. The Court found a right "broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy"213
in the "zones of privacy" created by the "First Amendment . . . the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments . . . the penumbras of the Bill of Rights . . . the Ninth
Amendment . . . or in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of
the Fourteenth Amendment."214 Roe engendered not only political controversy,
but also criticism by legal elites for its expansion of substantive due process
doctrine reminiscent of the vilified Lochner era. Most famously, then-Yale Law
School professor John Hart Ely critiqued the decision as having no basis in the
constitutional text.215 For legal feminists, Roe represented a victory for abortion
206. 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892).
207. Id.
208. 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that a law prohibiting the teaching of modern foreign languages
to grade students violated teachers' and parents' substantive liberties under the Fourteenth Amendment).
209. 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (finding a substantive due process right to educate one's children outside
the public school system).
210. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a law prohibiting the use of contraceptives violated married
couples' privacy rights).
211. Gutierrez v. Laird, 346 F. Supp. 289 (D.D.C. 1972).
212. Id.at290-91.
213. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
214. Id. at 152.
215. John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf? A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920,
926-37 (1973).
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rights but also a disappointment in its failure to locate the right to abortion in
women's constitutional right to sex equality under the Equal Protection
216Clause. Nevertheless, legal feminists attempted to use Roe as a doctrinal
basis upon which to articulate a constitutional vision for women's
interdependent rights to economic autonomy and to reproductive liberty.
At the time the Court decided Roe, tremendous uncertainty existed
regarding the contours of the Court's fundamental rights jurisprudence under
the Due Process Clause. Risa Goluboff has recently uncovered internal
Supreme Court memoranda demonstrating that the Court contemplated
expanding substantive due process to include liberties that extended beyond the
right to abortion to other exercises of individual freedom.217 The 1972 case of
Papachristou v. City ofJacksonville struck down a criminal vagrancy statute as
void for vagueness, but also implied a broad scope for the liberties that
substantive due process might protect.218 The decision talked about the
importance of the activities the defendants had engaged in, including walking,
loafing, and strolling, as part of people's enjoyment of the "amenities of
life." 2 19 The earliest draft of Justice Douglas's majority opinion in
Papachristou had argued that the right to enjoy the "amenities of life" formed
part of those rights retained by the people under the Ninth Amendment. Later
drafts located the right to enjoy the "amenities of life" in the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause.220 Brennan, however, had warned Douglas
that deciding Papachristou on the basis of an expanded fundamental rights
doctrine might alienate members of the Court, especially in light of the Roe v.
221Wade decision with which Justice Blackmun was then wrestling. When the
Court did expand the bounds of substantive due process in Roe, it remained
unclear the extent to which that doctrine might expand.
Legal feminists exploited that ambiguity to argue for a right to bear
children concomitant to the right to abortion. The Roe v. Wade decision
endowed feminists' use of fundamental rights doctrine to challenge pregnancy
dismissal policies, a strategy that Ginsburg had begun to innovate in Struck,
with greater discursive power. In February 1973, the ACLU Women's Rights
216. For a discussion of the women's movement's sex equality arguments for the right to abortion,
see Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical Basis and Evolving
Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815, 823-37 (2007).
217. Risa L. Goluboff, Dispatch from the Supreme Court Archives: Vagrancy, Abortion, and What
the Links Between Them Reveal About the History of Fundamental Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1361
(2010).
218. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
219. Goluboff, supra note 217, at 1364 (quoting Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 164).
220. Id. at 1365-67.
221. Brennan urged Douglas to instead write the Papachristou case on the basis of the vagueness
doctrine. Douglas's concurrence in Roe, furthermore, adopted a framework for recognizing fundamental
liberties under the Due Process Clause, which Brennan had outlined in another memorandum to
Douglas. Id. at 1380-81. While Papachristou had nearly been decided on the basis of substantive due
process, Blackmun's first drafts of Roe experimented with deciding the case on the basis of the void for
vagueness doctrine. Id. at 1379.
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Project hired a researcher to help develop a paper for publication entitled "The
Right to be Pregnant."222 Ginsburg wrote to Mary Ellen Schattman, who had
appealed the Fifth Circuit decision in her case to the Supreme Court as a pro se
litigant: "The inspiration [for the paper] came from you in the telephone
conversation in which you noted, even before the Court's abortion decisions,
the anomaly of providing free access to abortion while placing impediments in
the way of the woman who wants to bear her child." 223 Ginsburg's commitment
to using fundamental rights doctrine was not merely strategic, but also reflected
her beliefs about the social value of pregnancy: "It is a bit unsettling to have a
constitutional right to abort, with no adverse career consequences, while the
choice to bear a child is conditioned upon surrendering a service career!" 22 4
Ginsburg also offered her assistance to Vermont Legal Aid to help lawyers
bring a third military discharge case, Crawford v. Cushman.22 5 She suggested
that the plaintiff's brief to the district court should draw on Roe's precedent to
supplement the arguments made in Struck about women's fundamental rights to
privacy in reproductive decision-making and freedom of religion.226
Nevertheless, Ginsburg remained most optimistic about the brief's sex equality
arguments, which noted that Stephanie Crawford's general discharge rather
than an honorable one from the U.S. Marine Corps punished her for sexual
227relations when no similar policy punished men. She warned her colleague at
Legal Aid: "The theory that a fundamental right is at stake is not so firmly
grounded. You should make the sex-as-suspect classification argument." 22 8 The
district court opinion, ruling in favor of the Marine Corps, held that the
pregnancy discharge regulation violated neither Crawford's right to equal
protection nor her right to privacy.229 Not until 1977 would the Department of
Defense, against Army objections, rescind its policy of discharging pregnant
230women as a practice in conflict with equal treatment.
Soon after Ginsburg and Vermont Legal Aid submitted their briefs in
Cushman, however, the Tenth Circuit issued a decision connecting the issues of
pregnancy dismissal policies and abortion. The March 1973 opinion in Buckley
v. Coyle noted: "If the right to maintain freedom from interference with
terminating a pregnancy is a right of the magnitude described by the Supreme
222. Letter from Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gen. Counsel, Am. Civil Liberties Union, to Ms. Michael
D. Schattman (Feb. 13, 1973) (Ruth Bader Ginsburg Papers, box 7, folder: Schattman v. Texas
Employment Commission 1973) (on file with the Library ofCongress).
223. Id.
224. Letter from Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gen. Counsel, Am. Civil Liberties Union, to Mary Just
Skinner, Vt. Legal Aid (Feb. 2, 1973) (Ruth Bader Ginsburg Papers, box 3, folder: Crawford v.
Cushman 1973-1974) (on file with the Library of Congress).
225. 378 F. Supp. 717 (D. Vt. 1974).
226. Letter from Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Mary Just Skinner, supra note 224.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. See Crawford, 378 F. Supp. at 725-26 (D. Vt. 1974).
230. BErTIE J. MORDEN, THE WOMEN'S ARMY CORPS, 1945-1978, at 309 (1990).
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Court in Wade, certainly the interest here involved is entitled to at least similar
recognition."231 The court struck down a school board's pregnancy dismissal
policy as unconstitutional because it both discriminated on the basis of sex and
interfered with female teachers' privacy rights by forcing them to choose
between becoming pregnant and remaining employed.232 The infringement of
the plaintiffs fundamental rights, as well as the possibility that the school
applied its maternity policy in a racially discriminatory manner, led the circuit
court to hold that the trial court should evaluate the policy on remand under a
strict scrutiny rather than a rational basis standard,233
The Buckley decision represented an implicit affirmation of legal feminists'
critique of women's dependence within the family. The recognition that
pregnancy dismissal policies infringed on women's right to bear children
contained an implicit rejection of the family-wage ideal. One might argue that
the policies did not infringe on the childbearing right because women could still
bear children as economic dependents within the family, supported by
breadwinning men. In contrast, the argument that the pregnancy dismissal
policies infringed upon women's reproductive rights suggested that women had
a right to maintain socioeconomic independence while simultaneously
becoming mothers. In using Roe to challenge pregnancy dismissal policies,
legal feminists highlighted the interdependence of equality and liberty as
necessary conditions for women to realize full personhood under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
III. THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES CLEVELAND BOARD OFEDUCATION V.
LAFLEUR
Although Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur now rests at the
margins of the constitutional canon, in actuality it enacted a transformation in
women's legal status under the Fourteenth Amendment. The LaFleur case
required the justices of the Supreme Court to consider what was then, and
remains today, one of the most profound questions concerning women's legal
status: what is the relationship between women's interests in sex equality and
reproductive liberty? To legal feminists' chagrin, the Court did not decide
LaFleur under the Equal Protection Clause. Instead, the Court decided the case
under the doctrine of "irrebuttable presumptions," 234 which allowed the Court
to find the pregnancy dismissal policies unconstitutional while evading the
difficult questions about equal protection doctrine that were raised by the case.
Rehnquist's dissent in LaFleur, which quoted Burger's dissent in an earlier
231. Buckley v. Coyle, 476 F.2d 92, 96 n.3 (10th Cir. 1973).
232. Id. at 95-96.
233. Id. at 96-97.
234. See infra Subsection III.A.3.
2010] 387
388 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 22:2
irrebuttable presumptions case, aptly critiqued the doctrine: "literally thousands
of state statutes create classifications permanent in duration, which are less than
perfect, as all legislative classifications are, and might be improved on by
individualized determinations." 23 5 A year after LaFleur, writing a majority
opinion in Weinberger v. Salfi, Justice Rehnquist went out of his way to shut
the lid on an irrebuttable presumptions analysis, 23 6 which would emerge only
237once more in the Court's jurisprudence.
Still, the LaFleur opinion had implications much more profound and
worthy of serious consideration than did its incoherent and quickly discredited
doctrinal rationale. In striking down the pregnancy dismissal policies, the
decision lent the imprimatur of legal authority to the labor and legal feminist
vision for the interdependence of women's rights both to equal employment
opportunity and to reproductive liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment. The
case also approached the precipice of substantive due process in holding that
the challenged policies infringed upon women's right to bear children.
Ultimately, the LaFleur decision set constitutional limits on the law's
imposition of the family-wage system. The decision stood for the proposition
that the Constitution does not allow the state to interpret motherhood as
relegating women to dependence within the private family. Rather, women
have the right to become mothers and simultaneously to maintain
socioeconomic independence within the public sphere.
A. The Doctrinal Landscape
When the Supreme Court granted writs of certiorari in the cases of
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur and Cohen v. Chesterfield County
235. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 657 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(quoting Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 462 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
236. Salfi concerned a provision of the Social Security Act setting forth a duration-of-relationship
requirement for a "widow" or "child" to qualify for benefits. 422 U.S. 749, 753 (1975). Rehnquist's
majority opinion reversed the district court decision that had held that the provision was an
unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption, on the basis that the district court lacked jurisdiction. Id. at
756-67. Nevertheless, Rehnquist reached the merits to hold that the rational basis equal protection
standard set forth in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955), and Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970), rather than an irrebuttable presumptions analysis, governed the case. 422 U.S. at
767-73. Justice Douglas wrote a brief dissent stating that the legislative presumption at issue impeded
the right to a jury trial. 422 U.S. 749, 785-86 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting). A bolder dissent written
by Justice Brennan and joined by Justice Marshall stated that the majority holding was "flatly contrary
to several recent decisions," citing a series of irrebuttable presumptions cases. 422 U.S. at 802
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
237. In November 1975, in a per curiam opinion from which only Justice Rehnquist dissented, the
Court held unconstitutional a Utah law making pregnant women ineligible for unemployment benefits
from twelve weeks before the expected due date to six weeks after childbirth, stating that the law
involved nearly the identical presumption of incapacity as LaFleur. Turner v. Dep't of Emp't Sec., 423
U.S. 44,46 (1975).
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School Board, the Court's Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence was in
considerable flux. Since 1970, the Burger Court had frozen the Warren Court's
expansion of fundamental rights and equality jurisprudence via the application
of a strict scrutiny standard of review in equal protection cases. At the same
time, however, the Burger Court had gingerly begun to implement a more
searching form of rational basis scrutiny. What legal scholars called the "Newer
Equal Protection"239 complicated the classic two-tier system of adjudicating
equal protection claims. Meanwhile, the Court had added to the Warren Court's
revolution in criminal procedure, civil rights, and civil liberties by rejuvenating
substantive due process in Roe.
In a complex and dynamic legal landscape, several doctrinal paths stood
open to rule that the challenged pregnancy dismissal policies were
unconstitutional. Each of these paths also posed peculiar risks and
controversies. For the author of a potential opinion invalidating the policies, the
trick would be how to select a path that both sustained a majority and posed the
least risk of sending the Court in directions in which it did not want to proceed.
1. The Plaintifs'Arguments for Strict Scrutiny
The plaintiffs in the consolidated cases of Cleveland Board of Education v.
LaFleur and Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board argued that the Court
should apply a strict scrutiny standard of review to strike down the pregnancy
dismissal policies under the Equal Protection Clause.240 The plaintiffs first
argued that the pregnancy-based classification at issue discriminated on the
basis of sex. Highlighting the evolution in doctrinal standards from Reed to the
plurality opinion in Frontiero,241 the plaintiffs further argued that the Court
should make sex a suspect class under the Constitution.242 The plaintiffs
argued, in addition, that the Court should apply strict scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause because the leave policies infringed upon the plaintiffs'
fundamental rights. Cohen argued that "by requiring her to choose between
238. On April 23, 1973, the Supreme Court granted petitions for writs of certiorari submitted by the
Cleveland Board of Education for the Sixth Circuit and by Susan Cohen for the Fourth Circuit. 411 U.S.
947 (1973).
239. See infra Subsection III.A.2.
240. In the alternative, the teachers argued, the Court should strike down the maternity leave
regulations under rational basis scrutiny. Picker argued that the mandatory maternity leave policy had no
medical justification and only served the unconstitutionally invalid purpose of keeping pregnant women
out of sight. Brief for Respondents at 49-51, Cleveland Bd. of Edue. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974)
(No. 72-777).
241. Id.
242. "Regulations seeming neutral on their face, which single out members of only one sex for
special treatment discriminate on the basis of sex." Id. at 18. "Sex discrimination has been held to exist
when all or a defined class of women are subjected to disadvantaged treatment based on stereotypical
assumptions about their sex which operate to foreclose opportunity based on individual merit." Brief for
Petitioner at 6, Cohen v. Chesterfield Cnty. Sch. Bd., 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (No. 72-1129).
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employment and pregnancy, the mandatory leave rule trespasses upon . . . the
working women's right to privacy."243
The parties in LaFleur and Cohen put Roe v. Wade to opposite uses. The
defendant school boards used Roe to buttress their argument that the pregnancy
dismissal policies took rational account of the difference between pregnancy
and temporary disabilities. The school boards argued that pregnancy could not
constitute a temporary disability because the Supreme Court cases legalizing
birth control and abortion-Griswold, Eisenstadt v. Baird,244 and Roe-had
made pregnancy voluntary: "No female today, teacher or not, is required to
become pregnant." 245 Picker, however, contended that this interpretation of the
case law went beyond the reproductive rights recently conferred on women to
impose a deeply troubling set of obligations. Just as the Tenth Circuit had
stated in Buckley v. Coyle and as Ruth Bader Ginsburg had ruminated in
relation to Crawford v. Cushman, Picker's brief to the Supreme Court queried:
"Has woman today having gained the right not to be pregnant against her will
lost her former right to bear a child?" 246 Thus, Roe potentially opened the door
for a ruling that affirmed women's substantive liberty to bear children as a
corresponding right to that of abortion. That doctrinal path, however, might
lead the Court away from the dangerous realm of strict scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause to the even more hazardous realm of substantive due process.
The Court might, as plaintiffs urged, designate sex a suspect class or
interpret the policies as infringing on fundamental interests in childbearing and
work, thereby triggering strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. But
doing so would commit the Court to a rigid standard in a highly controversial
area of law, where most Justices probably feared to tread.
2. "Newer Equal Protection, " Sex Equality, and Reproductive Liberty
A second option facing the Court in LaFleur was to turn toward what
commentators had termed the "newer equal protection." If it chose this
doctrinal path, the Court would conduct a searching means-ends inquiry into
whether the pregnancy dismissal policies were substantially related to the
asserted state objectives.
In the early 1970s, the Burger Court departed from the classic, two-tier
equal protection scheme. That scheme, commentators noted, involved scrutiny
that was minimal in theory and toothless in fact and "scrutiny that was 'strict'
in theory and fatal in fact." 247 The Burger Court evinced a determination to end
243. Id. at 19.
244. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
245. Brief for Petitioner at 26, LaFleur, 411 U.S. 947 (No. 72-777).
246. Brief for Respondents, supra note 240, at 53.
247. Gunther, supra note 153, at 8.
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the Warren Court's expansion of fundamental interest jurisprudence.248 At the
same time, the court's minimal, or rational basis scrutiny now appeared to have
"bite." 249 Constitutional scholar Gerald Gunther observed in an influential
review of the 1971 term that the Court had implemented, sub silentio, a third,
more flexible standard that disrupted the classic, two-tier equal protection
250scheme. In a number of cases, the Court had performed a more searching
inquiry than that theretofore afforded under minimal scrutiny. The Court
inquired whether a law's means substantially furthered the law's ends.251 That
practice gave the Court a mechanism to stray from extreme legislative
deference, ostensibly without inquiring into the legitimacy of legislative
252purpose. Gunther called the changed doctrinal landscape the "newer equal
protection."
The Court used the new, amorphous means-ends inquiry to avoid treading
more definitively in especially controversial and uncertain areas of
constitutional doctrine.253 Cases involving sex equality and reproductive
privacy well illustrated this avoidance mechanism. In Reed, ACLU attorneys
Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Melvin Wulf made an analogy to race to argue that
254
the Court should make sex a suspect classification subject to strict scrutiny.
In a unanimous opinion, however, the Court invalidated the provision on the
ground that the state's means did not substantially relate to its objectives. 25 In
Eisenstadt v. Baird,256 the Court invalidated a state law prohibiting the
distribution of contraceptives to unmarried individuals. The plaintiffs had
argued for an extension of the privacy right established in the 1965 case of
Griswold v. Connecticut, 257 which had legalized the use of contraceptives by
248. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that public
education is not a fundamental Tight under the U.S. Constitution); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56
(1972) (holding that housing is not a fundamental interest); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)
(holding that the denial of welfare benefits did not infringe upon a freedom protected by the Bill of
Rights).
249. Gunther, supra note 153, at 12. Gunther surveyed fifteen equal protection cases that did not
involve either race or voting-triggers for strict scrutiny-and found that in ten of these cases the Court
affirmed the constitutional challenge, and in an eleventh the Court found the claim substantial enough to
remand. Id. at 11-12. Of these eleven cases, seven "acknowledge[d] substantial equal protection claims
on minimum rationality grounds." Id. at 19.
250. Id. at 19.
251. Id. at 18-20.
252. Id. at 21-23.
253. Id. at 29-30; Comment, Equal Protection in Transition, 41 FORDHAM L. REv. 605, 614-22
(1973); Note, Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre: The New, New Equal Protection, 72 MICH. L. REv. 508,
526-32 (1973).
254. For a comprehensive discussion of the use of the race analogy in Reed, see Serena Mayeri,
Constitutional Choices: Legal Feminism and the Historical Dynamics of Change, 92 CAL. L. REv. 755,
814-17 (2004).
255. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971).
256. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
257. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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married couples. The majority opinion in Baird sidelined the thorny issue of
reproductive privacy and instead employed a means-ends analysis. 258
By 1973, however, the Court indicated that it may be retreating from a
third equal protection standard and returning to the two-tier system of review.
In March, the Court held in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez that education was not a fundamental interest recognized explicitly
or implicitly by the Constitution.259 In what one commentator labeled a
11 260
"cryptic" footnote, the majority opinion characterized Baird as a strict
scrutiny case that had interpreted the challenged state law to infringe on
261fundamental rights. Then in April, Justice Brennan issued a plurality opinion
in Frontiero v. Richardson, representing four members of the Court, which
stated that sex should be treated as a suspect class. 2 62 Thus, in Rodriguez a
majority of the Court had resorted to traditional minimal scrutiny, while in
Frontiero a plurality of the Court had desired to extend strict scrutiny to a new
suspect class but had been unable to obtain a fifth vote. In neither of these
opinions did the Court rely on the kind of means-ends analysis Gunther had
identified. Thus, to decide LaFleur on the basis of rational basis scrutiny with
"bite" would return the Court to the "newer equal protection," contrary to the
most recent trend away from that doctrinal scheme.
3. Irrebuttable Presumptions Doctrine Under the Due Process Clause
If a majority of the Court desired to find the pregnancy dismissal policies
unconstitutional, but wanted to apply neither strict scrutiny nor ratcheted up
rational basis scrutiny, yet another option remained. The Court could choose a
safe, if evasive, route by using the rubric of procedural due process to
invalidate policies to which Justices might object on both equality and liberty
grounds.
As the Court drew back from the "newer equal protection," it developed a
doctrine under the Due Process Clause as an alternative mechanism for
263
avoiding the most controversial equal protection issues of the day. In three
258. Baird, 405 U.S. at 447.
259. 411 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1973).
260. Note, Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, supra note 253, at 539.
261. 411 U.S. at 34 n.73.
262. 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973).
263. For contemporaneous observations of this trend, see Randall P. Bezanson, Commentary, Some
Thoughts on the Emerging Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine, 7 IND. L. REv. 644, 658 (1974); Gary J.
Simson, The Conclusive Presumption Cases: The Search for a Newer Equal Protection Continues, 24
CATH. U. L. REV. 217, 219-20 (1975); Diana Feldman, Comment, The Right to Rebut: Conclusive
Presumptions in Civil Cases, 6 CoNN. L. REV. 725, 742 (1974); Comment, Constitutional Law: Court
Substitutes Conclusive Presumption Approach for Equal Protection Analysis, 58 MINN. L. REv. 965,
970 (1974).
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cases decided during the Court's 1972 and 1973 terms-Stanley v. Illinois,2 64
Vlandis v. Kline,265 and United States Department ofAgriculture v. Murry, 266
the Court employed an "irrebuttable presumptions" analysis to invalidate state
legislation. These cases struck down statutory regulations that disadvantaged a
class of persons on the basis of a legislative presumption, without affording the
opportunity to disprove the applicability of the presumption in individual
circumstances. Legal observers explained that the irrebuttable presumptions
analysis afforded the Court greater flexibility than had the "newer equal
protection." Equal protection analysis required the Court to choose between
allowing and denying a legislature's use of a particular classification. By
contrast, the irrebuttable presumptions analysis under the Due Process Clause
allowed for a legislature to retain a classification, so long as it provided an
opportunity for disadvantaged individuals to challenge the individual
267
applicability of the classification.
The irrebuttable presumptions analysis generated substantial criticism,
however, because of its logical incoherence. Nearly all legislation involved
overbroad and under-inclusive presumptions.268 The most heated criticism of
the irrebuttable presumptions doctrine suggested that it represented substantive
due process in a new, barely disguised procedural form. The Dean of the New
York University School of Law quipped only half-jokingly that the vilified
Lochner Court might have viewed the statute challenged in that case as creating
"an irrebuttable presumption that working in bakeries more than 10 hours a day
was unhealthy." 269 Because it would allow a court to strike down nearly any
form of legislative classification in the absence of individualized hearings or
other similarly robust process, the irrebuttable presumptions doctrine was
arguably nonsensical. The doctrine, however, also offered an "escape route"
264. 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972) (invalidating a state law that presumed that unwed fathers are unfit
parents and deprived these fathers of their children, upon the death of the children's mothers, without
giving the fathers individualized hearings in which they might establish their parental fitness).
265. 412 U.S. 441, 453 (1973) (holding that Connecticut's definition of "resident" for the purpose
of reduced tuition fees in the state university system violated the Due Process Clause because it involved
an "irrebuttable presumption" that classes of students living outside the state during the past year were
not "residents").
266. 413 U.S. 508, 513-14 (1973) (invalidating a provision of the Federal Food Stamp Act
containing the "irrebuttable presumption" that a household was not in need if one of its members aged
eighteen years or older had been claimed in the past tax period as a dependent by a non-member
taxpayer ineligible for food stamps).
267. Simson, supra note 263, at 232; see also Note, The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine: Equal
Process or Due Protection?, 72 MICH. L. REV. 800, 811-12 (1974) (comparing the strict scrutiny
standard and the irrebuttable presumptions doctrine).
268. See, e.g., Irving A. Gordon & Marvin A. Tenenbaum, Conclusive Presumption Analysis: The
Principle of Individual Opportunity, 71 Nw. U. L. REV. 579, 602 (1977); John M. Phillips, Irrebuttable
Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 449,462-63 (1975).
269. Norman Redlich, A Black-Harlan Dialogue on Due Process and Equal Protection: Overheard
in Heaven and Dedicated to Robert B. McKay, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 20, 40 (1975).
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that would "allow[] the Court to eliminate the law under review with only the
narrowest of consequences outside the confines of the case before it."270
B. The OralArgument
On October 15, 1973, Jane Picker made her first oral argument, in any
court, before the highest court of the land. Picker had since left Squire, Sanders
& Dempsey and now taught at Cleveland State University's Cleveland-
Marshall College of Law. 27 1 Picker litigated LaFleur in the Supreme Court
under the auspices of the Women's Law Fund with financial support provided
by the Ford Foundation.272 The discrimination Picker had faced at her prior
firm had shortchanged her of litigation experience. But Picker now possessed
something akin to a home court advantage. The courtroom was filled with
mostly young women. Although they were not allowed to hold signs or make
noise during the arguments, everyone there could tell which side they
supported.273
Maybe Picker's fury also boosted her confidence. When she stood up to
begin her argument, she saw that the Justices were passing around the most
recent issue of the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Journal. She
recognized the journal and recalled that the issue contained a comment entitled
"Love's Labors Lost: New Conceptions of Maternity Leaves." 274 The comment
critiqued the "procrustean choice" "between what become mutually exclusive
alternatives: having a family or continuing to participate in the labor force." 2 75
The authors argued that developments under Title VII, state Fair Employment
Practice legislation, and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence all counseled in
favor of the rights of pregnant women and suggested that the Supreme Court
should make sex a suspect classification under the Constitution.276 As Picker
began her argument, the Justices were looking at the comment and chuckling.
Picker remembers, "I was livid because I thought they were not taking the issue
seriously." 277
Picker's indignation regarding the Justices' apparent insensitivity to the
case's gravity only increased as the argument began. Justice Harry Blackmun
opened the questioning by asking about the parallels between the LaFleur case
270. Simson, supra note 263, at 227.
271. Because her prior firm had waived any assertion of a conflict of interest, Picker herself could
now sign the briefs for the teacher respondents and argue before the Court. Interview with Jane M.
Picker & Sidney Picker, supra note 96, at 3.
272. HARTMANN, supra note 3, at 162.
273. Interview with Jane M. Picker & Sidney Picker, supra note 96, at 5.
274. Erica B. Grubb & Margarita C. McCoy, Love's Labors Lost: New Conceptions of Maternity
Leaves, 7 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 260 (1972).
275. Id. at 260.
276. Id. at 264-76.
277. Interview with Jane M. Picker & Sidney Picker, supra note 96, at 4.
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and cases in which courts rejected challenges to beard and mustache
regulations in the workplace, reasoning that these regulations did not
discriminate on the basis of sex because they regulated a sex-unique
characteristic.278 Sidney Picker and Liz Moody had mooted Picker on this very
point, but Jane had told them she thought it would be "beneath the dignity of
the Court" to compare the regulation of beards and mustaches with "the
importance of repopulating the species."279 Now, arguing before the Court,
Picker responded that the analogy was "ludicrous."280 Sidney Picker was
terrified that Jane might be jeopardizing her case by insulting the Court.281
The oral argument in LaFleur did not want for dramatic tension. In 1973,
the Justices sat in a straight line unlike the semi-circle in which they are now
positioned. Picker soon tired of volleying questions from Justices she could not
see on either end of the row. She stepped back from the podium to gain a better
view, but no longer had the use of a microphone and needed to shout to answer
282
questions. The largely female audience murmured at key moments. At the
conclusion of oral argument, however, the result remained obscure. Phinaes
Indritz-the aging civil rights lawyer who had argued on behalf of the
defendant in Korematsu v. United States,283 which upheld the detention of
Japanese Americans during World War II-predicted that the case would go
seven to two in favor of the plaintiffs.284 He was the only one to envisage a
positive outcome. A few weeks later, however, Justice White contacted the
dean of Cleveland State University, with whom he had played college football,
and told him that one of the University's law professors had argued before the
Court and performed well. Picker recalls that when she heard word of the
285phone call, she thought she might have won the case.
C Sex Equality and Reproductive Liberty
When the Court handed down the LaFleur decision on January 21, 1974,
Picker rejoiced in the result but expressed disappointment in its rationale.286
Justice Stewart wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices Blackmun,
Brennan, Marshall, and White. Justice Douglas concurred in the result without





282. Id. at 5.
283. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
284. Interview with Jane M. Picker & Sidney Picker, supra note 96, at 5.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Douglas's voting pattern in prior irrebuttable presumptions cases suggested that he agreed
with the result in LaFleur, but wanted neither to venture into the realm of sex equality under the Equal
Protection Clause nor to reaffirm the propriety of an irrebuttable presumptions analysis.
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violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "because they
employ[ed] irrebuttable presumptions that unduly penalize a female teacher for
deciding to bear a child." 28 8
While ostensibly decided according to a theory of procedural due process,
the LaFleur opinion began with an affirmation of substantive law: "This Court
has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and
family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause." 289 The
majority next reasoned that terminating pregnant teachers at the end of the
fourth or fifth month of pregnancy did not serve the school board's asserted
interest in the continuity of classroom instruction.290 Citing Viandis and
Stanley, the opinion stated that the irrebuttable presumption that women
became physically unfit to teach in the classroom at the mid-way point in their
pregnancies deprived women of the opportunity to demonstrate that the
presumption did not apply in their individual cases.291 The opinion noted that
the medical experts who had provided testimony on both sides "unanimously
agreed . . . [that] the ability of any particular pregnant woman to continue at
work past any fixed time in her pregnancy is very much an individual
matter."292 Likewise, the Cleveland Board of Education's three-month
prohibition on teachers' return following childbirth created an irrebuttable
presumption of unfitness, when in fact an individual teacher might be capable
29of returning to work much earlier.29 The majority held that the school board's
administrative convenience in using the overbroad classifications could not
outweigh the deprivation of the female teachers' due process rights.294
Although disappointed and even angered by the Court's reluctance to
decide the case on equal protection grounds and to make sex a suspect class,
feminists and the general public recognized LaFleur as an "important victory
for women's rights." 2 95 The American Federation of Teachers Director of
Collective Bargaining, John Oliver, remarked about the decision: "Even though
the Court ignored the whole issue of sex discrimination and equal protection
(one more reason why we need to work for passage of the Equal Rights
Amendment!), it did rule that certain maternity leave policies violated the 14th
Amendment." 296 Marjorie Stem circulated among Federation locals an analysis
288. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 648 (1974).
289. Id. at 639.
290. Id. at 642-43.
291. Id. at 644-46.
292. Id. at 645.
293. Id. at 648-49.
294. Id. at 646-47.
295. Fred Barnes, High Court Limits Forced Leave in Pregnancies, WASH.-STAR NEWS, Jan. 2 1,
1974, at I (Women's Law Fund, box 23, folder 14) (on file with the Western Reserve Historical
Society).
296. Letter from John Oliver, Dir. of Collective Bargaining, Am. Fed'n of Teachers, to John
Ligtenberg (Jan. 31, 1974) (AFT Office of the President Collection, 1960-1974, box 7, folder 37) (on
file with the Walter Reuther Library, Wayne State University Archive of Labor & Urban Affairs).
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by a Federation attorney stating that extant pregnancy dismissal policies were
now unconstitutional and, consequently, were immediately nonbinding. 297
Lawyers believed the ruling would also "strengthen the hand" of the EEOC in
enforcing its pregnancy discrimination guidelines against private employers,
298even though the opinion directly applied only to government employees.
Nine months after the LaFleur decision, Jo Carol LaFleur began studies at Utah
College of Law. She autographed the case bearing her name in the textbooks of
her classmates in a first-year constitutional law class.299
1. LaFleur and the Sex Equality Dodge
The Justices' reluctance to understand LaFleur as a sex equality case
stemmed in significant part from their formalist interpretation of sex equality.
Like many of the lower federal courts analyzing pregnancy discrimination
cases, the Justices understood the regulation at issue in LaFleur to implicate
some classification other than that between men and women. On the day of the
oral argument, Justice Blackmun wrote a memo noting that equal protection
would provide an "easier" and "cleaner" basis for the decision than due
process. 30 0 Blackmun, however, did not think that the mandatory maternity
regulations constituted sex discrimination. From his perspective, the maternity
rules distinguished not between male and female teachers but "between those
who are disqualified to teach for reasons of pregnancy and those who are
disqualified for other medically indicated reasons." 301 Equal protection
mandated that the school boards treat pregnancy the same as other medical
disabilities, granting leave according to the facts of each individual's case.302
According to Blackmun's conference notes, all the Justices with the possible
exception of Thurgood Marshall agreed with him that the LaFleur case did not
concern sex discrimination. 303 Thus, eight of the Court's Justices, including
those who would join the majority, concur, and dissent, failed to see the case as
one about sex equality. Rather than investigating whether the pregnancy
297. Letter from Marjorie Stern to Mary Anne Evangelist (Mar. 31, 1974) (Marjorie Stem Papers,
Part II, box 5, folder 23) (on file with the Walter Reuther Library, Wayne State University Archive of
Labor & Urban Affairs).
298. Id.
299. Nesset-Sale, supra note 81, at 25.
300. Memorandum from Harry A. Blackmun to the Conference (Oct. 15, 1973) (Harry A.
Blackmun Papers, box 175, folder) (on file with the Library of Congress).
301. Id.
302. See id.
303. Justices Burger, Brennan, Stewart, and White stated explicitly that LaFleur was not a case
implicating a sex-based classification. Justice Powell analyzed the case as one triggering rational basis
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. Justice Douglas stated that he would vote to affirm, without
further discussion of the basis for his vote. Blackmun's notes for Justice Marshall read: "Pregnant
woman is the only one singled out." And his notes for Justice Rehnquist read: "will be arbitrary at some
point anyway." Harry A. Blackmun, Notes on Conference (Oct. 19, 1973) (Harry A. Blackmun Papers,
box 175, folder 1) (on file with the Library of Congress).
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dismissal policies entrenched sex-role stereotypes, the Court employed a
formalist interpretation of the classifications at issue.
The Court's upcoming docket provided an incentive not to interpret
LaFleur as a sex equality case. The month before deciding LaFleur, the
Justices had accepted an appeal from a case in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California. 3 Geduldig v. Aiello involved a
challenge to California's temporary disability insurance scheme, which
provided comprehensive coverage for all temporary disabilities except
pregnancy. Plaintiffs had won the argument in the district court that the
exclusion of pregnancy constituted sex discrimination in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.3 05 The case had sparked a heated legal and political
controversy. The director of the California Department of Human Resources
had predicted that extending temporary disability benefits to pregnancy would
cost $120 million and would bankrupt the state's insurance plan. 306 Just down
the road, the Supreme Court faced a daunting battle over the status of
pregnancy- and sex-based classifications under the Equal Protection Clause,
which would involve the Court in complex questions of distributive justice.
Ample reason existed for the Court to avoid ruling in LaFleur in a manner that
might logically commit the Court to finding for the plaintiffs in Geduldig.
The majority's dodge of the equal protection interests at issue in the case
did not go without notice. Justice Powell wrote a concurrence pointedly stating,
"equal protection analysis is the appropriate frame of reference."307 Powell
made clear upfront in his opinion what the majority had only hinted at: "that a
principal purpose behind the adoption of the [challenged maternity] regulations
was to keep visibly pregnant teachers out of the sight of schoolchildren." 0
Powell was troubled by "the implications of the [irrebuttable presumptions]
doctrine for the traditional legislative power to operate by classification."309
Powell wrote in his concurrence that the selectivity with which the Court
deemed some laws, but not others, to involve "irrebuttable presumptions"
suggested that "the concept at root often will be something else masquerading
as a due process doctrine. That something else, of course, is the Equal
Protection Clause." 310 Powell did not reach the questions of whether the
pregnancy dismissal policies constituted sex discrimination or whether sex-
based classifications should trigger strict scrutiny. 3 11 Rather, Powell argued that
304. Geduldig v. Aiello, 414 U.S. 1110 (1973) (noting probable jurisdiction and setting case for
oral argument).
305. Aiello v. Hansen, 359 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Cal. 1973), rev'd417 U.S. 484 (1974).
306. Disability Payment on Pregnancy Held Peril to Coast Plan, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1973, at 27.
307. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 651 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
308. Id. at 653.
309. Id. at 652. Powell had earlier expressed his concerns with the doctrine in a letter to Justice
Stewart. Letter from Lewis Powell to Potter Stewart (Dec. 11, 1973) (Harry A. Blackmun Papers, box
175, folder 1) (on file with the Library of Congress).
310. LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 652.
311. Id. at 653 n.2.
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the attenuation of the school boards' stated goals and the means they employed
to achieve them made the mandatory maternity leave policies arbitrary and thus
a violation of the constitutional right to equal protection. 312 Thus, Powell's
approach resurrected the kind of searching means-ends inquiry characteristic of
the "newer equal protection."
Contemporaneous legal commentary critiqued the LaFleur opinion as
equal protection masquerading as due process. The commentary went beyond
Powell's concurrence to discuss not only the rationality of the school's policy
but also the sex equality interests of the plaintiffs. For example, a student note
observed that although Stewart cloaked his opinion in the gowns of due
process, the majority had also taken note of sex equality concerns, specifically
the "stereotypical and irrational notions about women" that motivated the
pregnancy dismissal policies. 313 A commentator described the motivation
behind the decision: "Desiring to invalidate the regulations, but still unwilling
to accept the consequences of declaring sex a suspect class, the Court retreated
to the due process clause and the open-ended notion of irrebuttable
presumptions . . . ."314 Another critic viewed LaFleur as indicating that a
majority of Justices "intend[ed] to leave the ultimate resolution of the issue of
sex classifications up to popular mandate by way of acceptance or rejection of
the Equal Rights Amendment."m
Despite having resorted to a controversial and flawed doctrine to avoid
deciding LaFleur under the Equal Protection Clause, the majority opinion also
evinced a cautious recognition of the sex equality concerns at stake in the case.
The opinion buried in footnotes several comments about the sex-role
stereotypes at play in the pregnancy dismissal policies. Footnote nine
acknowledged that the challenged regulations reflected the schools'
preoccupation with "insulat[ing] schoolchildren from the sight of
conspicuously pregnant women." 316 Footnote fifteen conceded that the
Cleveland rule prohibiting women from returning to teaching for three months
following childbirth may have derived from the school board's belief "that new
mothers are too busy with their children within the first three months to allow a
return to work."317 The Court also recognized that the LaFleur case occurred
against the backdrop of expanding sex equality norms under Title VII. In yet
another footnote, the majority opinion noted that "[t]he practical impact of our
decision in the present cases may have been somewhat lessened" by the
312. Id. at 655.
313. Note, The Case of the Pregnant School Teachers: An Equal Protection Analysis, 34 MD. L.
REV. 287, 308 (1974).
314. J. Harvie Wilkinson I, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three
Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REv. 945, 993 (1975).
315. Case Notes, Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur: Mandatory Maternity Leave-Due
Process v. Equal Protection, 28 ARK. L. REv. 150,159 (1974).
316. 414 U.S. at 641 n.9.
317. Id.at649n.15.
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extension of Title VII's applicability to state agencies and educational
institutions as well as the promulgation of EEOC regulations prohibiting
pregnancy discrimination.318 Even though equal protection did not form the
doctrinal basis for the holding, a concern with the invalidity of the gender
stereotypes underlying the pregnancy dismissal policies inflected the majority
opinion.
Although a circumspect endorsement of equal opportunity for childbearing
women, LaFleur must also be understood as a milestone on the path to an equal
protection jurisprudence that excised pregnancy from the scope of
constitutional sex equality. As Jane Picker predicted, in deciding Geduldig v.
Aiello,319 the Court would "not be able to escape the issue [of sex
classifications under the Equal Protection Clause] as readily as it did in La
Fleur [sic]." 3 20 The Court's June 1974 decision in Geduldig held that the
singular exclusion of pregnancy- and childbirth-related disability from an
otherwise comprehensive state temporary disability insurance plan did not
violate women's rights to equal protection. Writing again for the majority,
Justice Stewart held that pregnancy-based classifications did not necessarily
321constitute sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.
In upholding the pregnancy exclusion, Geduldig ratified a constellation of
sex-role stereotypes. The defendant state of California, sympathetic amici, and
political commentators had argued that women did not need disability benefits
because they did not work to support their families; 322 that childbearing women
belonged in the home;323 that mothers did not make loyal workers;324 and that
breadwinning men would resolve the costs of reproduction.325 The Court's
willingness to invalidate sex-role stereotypes in LaFleur but not Geduldig may
318. Id. at 638 n.8 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10).
319. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
320. Letter from Jane M. Picker, Women's Law Fund, to Ronald S. Longhofer, Associate Editor,
Mich. Law Review (Feb. 13, 1974) (Women's Law Fund, box 23, folder 14) (on file with the Western
Reserve Historical Society); see also Letter from Ronald Longhofer, Associate Editor, Mich. Law
Review, to Lewis R. Katz, Professor of Law, Case W. Reserve Univ. (Women's Law Fund, box 23,
folder 14) (on file with the Western Reserve Historical Society) (requesting Picker's reaction to the use
of the "conclusive presumptions" doctrine in LaFleur).
321. 417 U.S. at 494-97.
322. See, e.g., Brief for Gen. Elec. Co. as Amicus Curiae at 9, Geduldig, 417 U.S. 484 (No. 73-640)
(arguing that pregnancy disability benefits would not serve "the purpose of disability insurance
protection . . . to protect employee earnings" because only half of new mothers returned to the
workforce).
323. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 20, Geduldig, 417 U.S. 484 (No. 73-640) (arguing that new
mothers would abuse pregnancy disability leaves by requesting such leave beyond the period of physical
incapacity to care for children in the home).
324. See, e.g., Brief of the Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. as Amicus Curiae at 12-13, Geduldig, 417 U.S. 484
(No. 73-640) (arguing that the low return rate of childbearing women to the workforce distinguishes
pregnancy and childbirth from temporary disabilities).
325. Brief for Gen. Elec. Co., supra note 322, at 22 n.13 (discussing a news magazine article
describing contemporary couples as making a voluntary, joint decision to have children and suggesting,
then, that the costs of women's dependence during pregnancy and childbirth should remain the burden
of the private family).
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have derived from the fact that the latter but not the former case involved a
claim to state resources. The plaintiffs in LaFleur asked the Court to prohibit
market-irrational forms of pregnancy discrimination. By contrast, a finding for
the plaintiffs in Geduldig would have implicated the Court in restructuring a
social-welfare program to render the program's allocation of the financial
burdens of disability more compatible with an interpretation of constitutional
sex equality.326 Like the labor feminists who struggled to achieve paid
pregnancy disability and parental leave, 32 7 legal feminists discovered that the
liberalization of sex discrimination law stopped short of an interpretation of sex
equality that entailed affirmative rights to state resources.
By the time the Court came to apply intermediate scrutiny to sex under the
Equal Protection Clause, in the 1976 case of Craig v. Boren, 32 the Court had
thus placed the legal regulation of pregnancy at a considerable distance from
the boundaries of constitutional sex equality. Undoubtedly, the Court found
granting heightened scrutiny to sex a safer bet once that standard could be
certain not to reach the regulation of pregnancy. Geduldig is thus an important
part of the story of the origins of equal protection standards.329 Not until the
2003 case of Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs330 would the
Court hold for the first time that the legal regulation of pregnancy on the basis
of sex-role stereotypes violated constitutional sex equality.
2. LaFleur and the Precipice of Substantive Due Process
Having approached LaFleur's implications for constitutional sex equality
with great trepidation, the majority strode more boldly toward the precipice of
substantive due process. Significant differences set the majority opinion in
LaFleur apart from the three prior cases decided based on an irrebuttable
presumptions analysis. To begin, in Stanley, Vlandis, and Murry, which
concerned individual interests related to childrearing, education, and food
stamps, respectively, the Court had not explicitly highlighted the presence of a
fundamental right at stake. By contrast, Stewart's opinion began with the
affirmation of a substantive, fundamental right to reproductive liberty protected
326. See Dinner, supra note 52.
327. See supra Part I.B.
328. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Craig v. Boren involved the politically banal question of whether a state
could set the minimum age to purchase 3.2% beer at twenty-one years for males and at eighteen years
for females. Id. at 191-92. Brennan's opinion set forth an intermediate-scrutiny standard for analyzing
sex-based classifications under the Equal Protection Clause: "classifications by gender must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives." Id. at 197.
329. For further discussion, see Dinner, supra note 52.
330. 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (upholding the provision of the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 that
allows state employees to sue their employers for violations of the Act as a valid exercise of Congress's
power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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by the Due Process Clause. 3 3 1 Furthermore, the three prior opinions had all held
that conclusive presumptions under the law had to give way to hearings that
would afford individuals the opportunity to rebut the presumptions. 332In
LaFleur, however, Stewart included a footnote explaining that the majority's
holding did not require "an individualized determination in each case and in
every circumstance" to determine whether a pregnant teacher had the capacity
to continue working. 333 Stewart suggested that a tighter nexus between the
classification and the class of disadvantaged persons would satisfy
constitutional requirements. For example, "widespread medical consensus"
regarding the disabling effects of pregnancy in the last few weeks before
childbirth might justify a categorical regulation. 334 Stewart's opinion in
LaFleur, at its core, did not concern procedure so much as the infringement of
an overbroad, irrational classification on a substantive right.
Several commentators considered LaFleur a substantive due process
case.335 That conclusion represented three distinct strands of analysis. First,
legal analysts noted that for a deprivation of liberty or property to violate
procedural due process-as the irrebuttable presumptions doctrine suggested-
the individual had to possess an underlying entitlement to the interest at
stake.3 36 Determination of which interests in liberty and property represented
such entitlements and which did not entailed a substantive judgment. 33 7 Thus,
the majority in LaFleur held that the plaintiffs possessed a fundamental interest
in reproductive freedom infringed upon by the pregnancy dismissal policies.
Second, legal scholars argued that substantive due process employed a
means-ends analysis that reflected the moral judgments of the Court. On
occasion, the defendant government entity would attempt to hide a law's
patently illegitimate objectives by arguing that the law served other legitimate
objectives.338 Distinguishing whether the challenged law served the alleged
legitimate objective or the real, illegitimate one would involve courts in
normative conclusions characteristic of substantive due process.339 The
majority opinion in LaFleur performed this kind of analysis when it suggested
that the pregnancy dismissal policies did not serve the stated interest in
331. Cleveland Bd. of Edue. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 640 (1974).
332. See U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 512-14 (1973); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S.
441, 453-54 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649-50 (1972).
333. LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 647 n.13.
334. Id.
335. See Toxey H. Sewell, Conclusive Presumptions and/or Substantive Due Process of Law, 27
OKLA. L. REv. 151, 158-59 (1974); Comment, Entitlement, Enjoyment, and Due Process of Law, 1974
DUKE L.J. 89, 106 n.73.
336. Comment, supra note 335, at 93,98.
337. Comment, Growth of Procedural Due Process into a New Substance: An Expanding
Protection for Personal Liberty and a "Specialized Type of Property ... In Our Economic System," 66
Nw. U. L. REv. 502, 524-25 (1971).
338. Michael J. Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited: Reflections on (and Beyond) Recent
Cases, 71 Nw. U. L. REv. 417, 425 (1977).
339. Id. at 425-26.
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continuity of classroom instruction and when it hinted in footnotes that other,
illegitimate objectives had actually motivated the policies.
Third, scholars saw the LaFleur opinion as simply an extension of the
substantive due process right to privacy recognized in Roe. A comment in the
California Law Review described LaFleur as a paradigm case of judicial
protection of privacy in "intimate decision thinking." 34 0 Stewart's opinion had
listed a string of privacy-related cases from Skinner v. Oklahoma to Roe
without ever mentioning the word privacy. 34 1 Yet, LaFleur had extended the
privacy right to involve freedom not only from direct prohibitions on certain
intimate, reproductive decisions but also from "oblique interference."342
Critics as well as supporters of the opinion believed that it affirmed
substantive due process rights to reproductive liberty as well as to protection of
one's tenure in public employment against dismissal on the basis of legislative
classifications that could be characterized as irrebuttable presumptions.
Rehnquist's dissent in LaFleur quoted Stewart's concurring opinion in Roe that
"the 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause . . . covers more than those
freedoms explicitly named in the Bill of Rights."343 Rehnquist then noted that
Stewart had relied for this statement on a 1915 case, Truax v. Raich, commonly
viewed as a nascent expression of a substantive due process right to work.
Rehnquist concluded in his dissent to LaFleur: "Since this right to pursue an
occupation is presumably on the same lofty footing as the right of choice in
matters of family life, the Court will have to strain valiantly in order to avoid
having today's opinion lead to the invalidation of mandatory retirement statutes
for governmental employees." 345 Although Rehnquist did not view LaFleur as
supporting a substantive due process right to work per se, he did understand the
majority opinion to imply a substantive due process right to tenure in one's
public employment.
Some progressive advocates celebrated this dimension of the opinion. Had
LaFleur held only that the challenged policies infringed on the right to bear a
child without adequate procedure, in that case the decision would have stood
simply for the proposition that "an aggrieved employee is only entitled to
freedom from arbitrary procedures when a substantive right defined elsewhere
340. Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision, 64 CAL. L.
REv. 1447, 1468 (1976).
341. Id. at 1468-69.
342. Id. at 1468. The pregnancy dismissal policies invalidated by the Court had not prohibited
women from deciding to bear children but had deterred exercise of that right by requiring women to
sacrifice their jobs and wages to exercise it. Id.
343. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 659 (1974) (Rehnquist., J., dissenting)
(quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 168 (1973)).
344. Id. (quoting Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915) ("It requires no argument to show that the
right to work for a living .. . is of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was
the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure.")).
345. Id. at 658-60.
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in the Constitution is threatened."304 The decision went "well beyond" 347 that
holding, however, to question "the substantive rationality of the pregnancy rule
itself."348 The opinion "hint[ed] at" a substantive due process right to
"protection from arbitrary government dismissal [from public employment],
independent of any other right granted by the Constitution."3 49 Constitutional
scholar Mark Tushnet outlined a framework that might guide the Court's
discretion in identifying substantive due process rights such as "a constitutional
right to civil service tenure for lower-level bureaucrats."so Another
commentator went further to argue that LaFleur and Vandis together rendered
mandatory retirement statutes, in the absence of individualized hearings,
unconstitutional.351
Regardless of their position on LaFleur's consequences for mandatory
retirement statutes, progressive scholars and advocates understood LaFleur as
sustaining individual self-determination against the bounds of state power. A
colleague of Jane Picker wrote to her: "If the dissent is correct regarding the
decision of the majority, then it would be a landmark decision, though not the
one you wanted. But it would put 'a new shine on the concept of individuality
and the survival of the individual in a world bent on his (her) destruction."'352
Harvard Law Professor Laurence Tribe argued that LaFleur exemplified a form
of "structural due process." In cases of peculiar social and moral disagreement
and intense cultural contest, Tribe argued, the state could not apply categorical
rules to individuals' disadvantage but must engage in dialogue with individuals
about the nature of such rules and their application. 35 3 The affirmation of
individual self-realization that progressive advocates identified in LaFleur
represented an instantiation of the self-determination ideal central to the legal
liberalism of the era. Although the decision did not further equal protection
doctrine, it did advance the status of women as rights-bearing individuals
within a liberal polity that set constitutional limits on the ability of the state to
regulate according to group characteristics.
In 1974, the LaFleur case had multiple, expansive meanings that the
existing historical and constitutional scholarship has forgotten. Though not
decided on the basis of equal protection, the decision represented the
culmination of labor and legal feminist campaigns against the sex
346. Comment, Substantive Due Process: The Extent of Public Employees' Protection from
Arbitrary Dismissal, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1647, 1650 (1974).
347. Id. at 1650.
348. Id. at 1651.
349. Id. at 1648.
350. Mark Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestion for the Revival of Substantive Due Process,
1975 SUP. CT. REV. 261, 286-87.
351. Comment, The Constitutional Challenge to Mandatory Retirement Statutes, 49 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 748, 786-90 (1975).
352. Letter from Jim, to Jane Picker (Jan. 27, 1974) (Women's Law Fund Records) (on file with the
Western Reserve Historical Society).
353. Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 308-09 (1975).
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discrimination exemplified by pregnancy dismissal policies. The majority
opinion hinted at the sex equality interests at stake in the case. And
commentators on the opinion ranging from Justice Powell in concurrence, to
feminist attorneys, to legal scholars, noted that the "irrebuttable presumptions"
doctrine formed a thin veil for the equal protection concerns implicated by
LaFleur. Likewise, though decided on the basis of an illogical theory of
procedural due process, which would subside within less than two years, the
decision came notably close to an explicit expansion of substantive due
process. The majority opinion drew upon the line of substantive due process
cases reaching their apex in Roe to articulate a fundamental right to bear
children and applied a searching means-ends inquiry, influenced by the weight
of the right at stake, to invalidate the challenged policies. Commentators
ranging from Justice Rehnquist in dissent to advocates on the opposite end of
the legal spectrum interested in expanding workers' rights understood LaFleur
to imply a substantive due process right to public employees' protection in their
job tenure against arbitrary dismissal. Although Justice Stewart had likely
viewed the "irrebuttable presumptions" doctrine as a ready escape from the
thicket of equal protection and a narrow basis for a politically non-controversial
opinion, LaFleur possessed potentially radical implications.
Perhaps the most significant meaning of the decision is one not recognized
at the time but that is visible in hindsight. Cleveland Board of Education v.
LaFleur contained a nascent recognition of the relationship between women's
rights to sex equality and to reproductive liberty. The labor and legal feminist
campaigns against pregnancy dismissal policies had argued that the right to
equal employment opportunity would ring hollow if conditioned upon a
woman's disavowal of childbearing. And the right to bear children should not
require women's socioeconomic dependence within the home. The labor and
legal feminist campaigns challenged conservative sexual mores, stereotypes
regarding women's capacity for work, and the family-wage ideal that
underpinned pregnancy dismissal policies. In recognizing the justness of these
campaigns, the LaFleur opinion also affirmed the feminist vision for equality
and liberty as mutually dependent conditions of women's personhood under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
LaFleur cautiously, sloppily, even surreptitiously stitched together the
equality and liberty interests that Roe had driven apart and that Geduldig would
again sever. Justice Stewart's opinion held that policies that excluded pregnant
women and new mothers from the workplace infringed upon women's
reproductive liberty. This conclusion depended upon a transformation of the
legal construction of the family, from the family-wage ideal to one premised on
women's right to act as both mothers and workers. From the perspective of the
family-wage ideal, pregnancy dismissal policies did not infringe upon women's
reproductive rights because childbearing women were supposed to be the
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economic dependents of breadwinning males. Only if one recognized women's
rights to compete as equals with men for employment opportunities did one see
that the pregnancy dismissal policies infringed upon women's reproductive
liberties. In holding unconstitutional the legal regulation of pregnancy on the
basis of sex-role stereotypes, LaFleur recognized the interdependence of
women's rights to equal employment opportunity and to reproductive liberty.
CONCLUSION
The social and legal history of Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,
which I have recovered in this Article, reveals multiple insights that our neglect
of LaFleur in the constitutional canon has obscured. The history of the labor
and legal feminist campaigns against pregnancy dismissal policies, which form
the backdrop to LaFleur, illustrate the symbiosis that existed among union
activism for women's rights, feminist litigation, and evolving sex
discrimination law in the early 1970s. The lower federal court decisions which
preceded LaFleur show judges grappling with the meaning of pregnancy within
nascent principles of civil rights and sex equality. The law evolved to
delegitimize pregnancy dismissal policies, even as judges subscribed to
formalist interpretations of sex equality and to the ongoing legal salience of
biological sex difference. This history, in conjunction with that of the right to
abortion, reveals how feminists began to experiment with fundamental rights
arguments challenging pregnancy dismissal policies and how Roe threw open
the door to substantive due process arguments regarding the right to bear
children. Finally, recovering the history of the Court's deliberation in LaFleur,
as well as the reaction to the opinion, demonstrates the richer implications of
the opinion that we have forgotten in criticizing the doctrinal basis for the
decision. Ultimately, the LaFleur doctrine challenges us to consider the
implications for today's legal dilemmas of the fact that the Court once
recognized the interdependence of women's equality and liberty interests.
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